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Pending legislation to address carbon emissions would include large
subsidies for existing emitters. These subsidies make little sense
economically or politically. Worse, they divert resources needed to
address two crucial issues that the proposed legislation largely ignores:
the impact of raising carbon costs on low-income people and the massive
structural federal deficit.
A carbon tax or cap-and-trade system would increase costs
substantially not only for transportation but for food and housing. With
poverty rising even before the current economic downturn, these price
increases’ consequences could be dire. The structural deficit will require
deflationary tax increases or spending cuts. Combining carbon regulation
with these measures could do severe damage.
Although few challenge their merits, these proposals may nonetheless
fail if a consensus emerges that they are extraneous to climate change
legislation. Overly complex legislation often does bog down, and we lack
coherent normative principles for “issue joinder” in public policy debates.
Such principles can be derived and counsel addressing both low-income
subsidies and deficit reduction as part of climate change legislation.
Another challenge is finding efficient means to deliver subsidies
without disrupting incentives to conserve. Energy companies are likely to
divert proposed allocations for this purpose to writing off bad debt.
Funding energy assistance programs similarly will crowd out existing
resources. Prior piecemeal efforts to address high energy costs provide
invaluable lessons on designing a system to offset rising carbon costs
without distorting consumers’ incentives. The large majority of proceeds
not needed for low-income subsidies should be reserved for deficit
reduction.
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I. Introduction
In legislation as in litigation, the outcome springs from two separate choices.
First, the system must determine which issues will be joined for decision.
Second, it must decide them. In both legislative and judicial law-making, the
second of these issues receives far more attention. Just as we only occasionally
note what claims or parties the trial court excluded from a case that became
prominent in an appellate court, we focus on the final legislation enacted, or
perhaps on the bill defeated, not on the process by which that particular set of
issues came together as a single bill.
This focus on ultimate decisions in part reflects their more obvious finality.
Their binary character, and the more accessible substantive grounds that
ostensibly drive them, also contribute to the tendency to attend to final decisions
at the expense of those formulating the issues for resolution. Finally, courts and
legislatures typically handle questions of which issues to join for decision
relatively inconspicuously: through dry motion practice in litigation and in
backroom negotiations legislatively.
Issue and party joinder in litigation results from both strategic considerations
and normative rules. Parties seek or oppose joinder to confuse or focus a jury, to
broaden or simplify discovery, to exhaust opponents’ resources or to husband
their own, and for a host of other strategic reasons. Procedural rules and trial
judges’ discretion allow or restrict joinder based on normative considerations.
Party joinder in legislatures is controlled constitutionally: except in rare cases
where a member’s qualifications or misconduct are at issue, the identities of the
parties are as fixed as those of the adjudicators within the legislative process –
because the two groups are the same. Legislative issue joinder, however, reflects
the same mix of parties’ strategic judgments and the system’s normative
concerns. Legislators and interest groups advising them make strategic
judgments about which aggregation of issues will best advance their affirmative
or negative agendas. The system imposes normatively driven constraints on their
ability to pursue their chosen strategies. As with litigation, these external
constraints come from a combination of explicit rules and exercises of discretion.
The mix of rules and discretion varies by legislative body: many state
legislatures have rules effectively limit each bill to a single object while others
either lack or ignore such rules. Congress generally allows particularly
freewheeling issue joinder. This offers numerous means for burdening
opponents’ proposals with unpopular or distracting riders. As a result, a common
way of favoring a particular substantive result, such as deficit reduction or closing military bases, is to establish special rules limiting the issues that may be
joined to such initiatives.
A paucity of rules imposing ex ante principles for legislative issue joinder is
particularly important because discretion over those matters is exercised not by
impartial judges but rather by the same opinionated legislators that will
ultimately decide the issue. Debate in the broader political arena, however, can
circumscribe legislators’ ability to serve their own strategic interests on joinder
questions. For example, voters may punish legislators for voting against joinder

of a proposal they favor not understanding joinder’s potential to bring down an
underlying bill that they also support. And in the broader political arena, no
formal rules constrain joinder of either parties or issues. Voters and even journalists are far less savvy about how alternative aggregations of issues will
influence ultimate outcomes. The norms that guide their judgments about which
interests, and which claims, are sufficiently related to deserve to be heard as part
of a particular debate therefore can have a powerful impact on the ultimate policy
outcomes.
Many of the same norms that limit joinder in litigation also guide it in the
legislative process. Both arenas permit joinder to avoid duplicative and
inconsistent decision-making but seek to guard against a problem becoming so
cumbersome that it delays resolution of the core dispute or risks confusing the
decision-maker.1 Some may conceptualize this inquiry in essentially utilitarian
terms: finding the degree of aggregation that maximizes economies of scale.
Others, however, temper these calculations with judgments that some claims
have an intrinsic right to be joined with closely related claims regardless of the
consequences.
The myopic focus on ultimate decisions renders students of legislation oddly
flatfooted at crucial times. With legislation, as opposed to judge-made law,
playing an ever more dominant role in the U.S. legal system, the inability to
understand principles of legislative joinder is the rough equivalent of being
unable to anticipate the precedential implications of a new common law or
constitutional decision. For example, a fundamental change in the politics of an
issue may make clear that some legislation is likely. Without understanding
legislative joinder, however, observers cannot begin to estimate the likelihood
that this substantive consensus will produce a broad response, a narrow response,
or unexpected gridlock: will agreement on large issues carrying along a host of
more contestable measures on smaller points, will the legislature insist on
keeping the legislation “clean” of distracting side issues to ensure quick approval
of a narrow initiative, or will enough disputed side issues be joined to fracture the
apparent majority for the underlying initiative and yield no legislation at all.
The lack of a coherent theory of legislative joinder also hobbles judicial
interpretation of statutes. Most theories of interpretation begin with inquiries into
actual or hypothetical intent. Commonly, the court will assert that those that
enacted the statute in question likely had this or that intent. For example, Einer
Elhauge posits that the polity enacting a statute would want interpreting courts to
consider legislative history because that would maximize the polity’s influence
on subsequent public policy.2 He assumes that a court can determine which of
the possible interpretations would have been most likely to have been enacted,
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had they been presented to the legislators that created the statute at issue.3 Others
have made similar claims.4 Yet as Kenneth Arrow demonstrated, under many
common arrangements of preferences, this question may be unanswerable
without knowing the order in which the proposals come up for decision. Which
choice a legislature would have made even more commonly depends on joinder
decisions – especially when the actual legislation relied on strategic votes from
legislators that did not support the disputed provision at all.
New Textualists, most prominently Justice Scalia, disparage this inquiry on
several grounds, including the impossibility of ascertaining a unitary intent
among the scores or hundreds of people whose assent was required to enact the
legislation and the risk that judges will disguise their own willfulness as a search
for legislative intent.5 Yet in New Textualists’ search for what the words of a
law mean, they consider a kind of hypothetical intent: what would someone
using this language mean.6 Although this inquiry does not depend on what a
particular legislature meant on a particular occasion, it nonetheless relies on a
sense of how the legislature typically speaks. Thus, for example, a New
Textualist may find an interpretation “wrong if it does not fit with the use of [that
term] throughout the Act.”7 That implicitly assumes a joinder process that
produces a coherent whole. Textualist and non-textualist judges alike may read
statutes on related subjects in pare materia, applying interpretations from one to
another.8 Yet if the two are separate because legislative joinder rules prevented
them from being enacted together, merging them at the interpretive stage
effectively defies the legislature’s choice.
Perhaps the most famous modern example of the pivotal role of joinder is the
prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of sex in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Looking at the overall political climate at the time, virtually no one
would believe that this country was prepared to enact such sweeping legislation.
In fact, the ban on sex discrimination may never have had sincere majority
support in Congress. It entered, and remained in, the legislation on the strength
of a coalition of sincere supporters – a distinct minority – and virulent racists,
who saw the sex discrimination ban as a “poison pill” whose joinder could bring
down the legislation as a whole.9 The lack of majority support for the provision
3
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on the merits subsequently has posed severe challenges for intentionalist judges
seeking to interpret it.10
More recently, opponents of a bankruptcy overhaul with overwhelming
congressional support (reflecting the credit card companies’ campaign
contributions) managed to stall action for several years in large part by joining
abortion to the debate. The opponents demanded that the legislation deny
bankruptcy relief to damage awards against persons obstructing access to
abortion clinics. Once they won joinder, the two sides in the abortion debate
each became determined not to allow the bill to pass without a treatment of the
issue that they favored.
The failure to account for legislative issue joinder also calls into question the
assumptions about institutional competence that underlie much contemporary
constitutional theory. Even if one believes that the legislature is better at making
certain kinds of ultimate decisions once properly framed,11 if its joinder rules
prevent the pivotal choices from coming up for a vote, those superior capacities
may never come to the fore and hence be irrelevant to the extent of judicial
deference properly afforded. Distortions resulting from joinder rules, like those
flowing from the disproportionate leverage of concentrated interest groups,12 can
prevent the median legislator’s will from prevailing and, for analogous reasons
might justify a more searching form of judicial review.13 Indeed, because
problematic joinder rules defeat rather than merely distort the will of the
majority, they may be more compelling candidates for offsetting reductions in
judicial deference.14
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-16 (1985).
10
See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County 480 U.S. 616, 629 (1987)(relying of
congressional intent with regard to race as a guide to resolving gender case)..
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(1962)(seeing the legislature as aggregator of public opinions); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 173 (1921)(warning judges to maintain their separate functions); see
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 88-94 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, eds. 1994)..
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The current health care reform debate offers a case in point. At this writing, the median senator
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provision of health insurance through a “public option.” The inability to marshal sixty votes to
defeat a potential Republican filibuster, however, may force the Democratic leadership to invoke
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Rarely have the legal, political, and ethical difficulties surrounding legislative
joinder become more important than in the current climate change debate. The
election of a president committed to action on climate change, with apparently
comfortable congressional majorities, led many to believe that legislation’s
enactment is assured. A close vote in the House and delayed consideration in the
Senate have exposed the political difficulties of the issue. What has remained
largely unappreciated is how the scope of legislative joinder will determine the
content and long-term consequences of that legislation.
In particular, three important classes of claims have competed for inclusion in
climate change debates and legislation. First, current carbon emitters have
sought compensation for the increased costs that emissions reductions will
impose on them. Second, advocates for low-income consumers have sought
offsets for higher prices to avoid being driven deeper into poverty. And third,
persons across the political spectrum have advocated for using the proceeds of
emissions permit sales to reduce the soaring federal deficit. Although a wealth of
polling shows the electorate has by far the strongest feelings about reducing the
deficit, that is the one set of claims whose joinder with the climate change debate
seems to have been most decisively rejected. By contrast, compensating existing
emitters, the set of claims with the greatest potential to undermine the core goal
of carbon emission reductions and the one that, at least as applied to industrial
emitters, likely has the least public support, has taken a dominant position in the
debates and legislative process. Some of this is a familiar public choice tale of
the effectiveness of small, concentrated interest groups, particularly those with
enormous wealth. Another part of the explanation, however, lies in unarticulated
conceptions of which kinds of claims are or are not too tangential to merit inclusion in a particular debate. Understanding how these conceptions regulate
legislative joinder is crucial both to improving environmental, anti-poverty, and
fiscal policy in the near- and long-term and to developing a theory of legislative
joinder applicable across substantive areas.
Receiving huge allocations of carbon permits free of charge would provide an
enormous windfall to these energy companies, far exceeding any losses they
might experience due to the reductions in permissible emissions. These allocations also have largely crowded out distributional and fiscal concerns. Policies
increasing the cost of energy will disproportionately affect low-income people,
who pay more for energy costs as a proportion of their budgets than more
affluent households. Some prominent proposals for regulating climate change
also include large subsidies for existing carbon emitters; the vast majority of
several Republicans, including the House and Senate Minority Leaders, introduced legislation that
would expand health insurance coverage far beyond what current law then or now provided.
Overwhelming majorities of representatives and senators co-sponsored at least one sweeping
reform bill. The Democratic leadership’s inability to formulate workable joinder principles, rather
than any substantive disagreements, prevented meaningful action on the floor of either chamber and
resulted in an outcome, preservation of the status quo, more restrictive than almost any Members
preferred.
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these subsidies would accrue to the relatively affluent owners of these companies, further exacerbating the regressive impact.
In addition, climate change regulation will have major fiscal implications.
Even after the current recession-induced surge in the deficit subsides, current
policies condemn the United States to a long-term fiscal imbalance estimated at
around three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP). A gap of this size
cannot be closed without considerable economic pain.15 Emissions reduction,
through a carbon tax or an auction of carbon emissions permits, is the one major
opportunity available for closing a large part of that gap that would structure that
pain in a socially constructive manner. Conversely, the economy may suffer
serious harm if it must absorb both the disruption of carbon emissions curbs that
do not reduce the deficit and separate deficit control legislation. Restraining
environmental waste while committing fiscal waste would be a grim irony
indeed.
This article is a first, modest step at filling these important gaps. It contends
that the climate change debate needs to be expanded from its current exclusive
focus on environmental and business concerns to consider distributive justice and
fiscal policy. In particular, it criticizes proposals to give away valuable
emissions permits as the irresponsible product of industry’s rent-seeking.
Instead, it urges that any permitting regime should auction off emissions permits,
devoting the proceeds to aid to low-income people, basic research likely to lead
to alternative energy sources and greater energy efficiency, and reducing the
structural federal deficit. In the process, it develops principles for delineating the
bounds of other social policy debates with potentially complex, far-flung
interactions.
Part II provides an overview of the politics and economics of climate change
policy. It does not rehearse the scientific arguments for action: that has been
done elsewhere with far more power and eloquence than this essay could hope to
match. It does, however, highlight the distributional and fiscal components of
the climate change problem that public discourse to date has largely ignored. It
then demonstrates that the heavy corporate subsidies in emerging climate change
proposals are neither politically nor economically justified.
Although some environmental groups have shown a laudable sensitivity to
distributional issues, many have argued that any broadening of the terms of the
debate increases the risk of impasse and failure. And few environmentalists have
shown much willingness to admit fiscal concerns to the debate. Starting from the
premise that the pending arrangement is not inevitable, Part III seeks to derive
principles for determining when additional constraints, such as the distributive
and fiscal concerns offered here, should be admitted to a policy debate over the
existing participants’ objections. These principles must find a plausible middle
15
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ground between heedless, narrow-minded policy-making that causes serious
ancillary damage to other important social values, on the one hand, and miring
important social initiatives in the complexities of extraneous issues, on the other.
Applying these principles to the present debate, it finds strong reasons to include
distributional and fiscal considerations in the climate change debate.
Part IV explores the extent to which climate change regulation can address
this country’s long-term fiscal imbalances. It also offers principles to guide the
design of a program to offset higher energy costs’ impact on low-income people.
It then draws lessons from existing anti-poverty programs to suggest specific
terms for such a program.
Part V concludes briefly.
II. Climate Change Policy in Context
To date, most media coverage of the climate change debate has focused on
science. This choice reflects in part industry’s and the Bush Administration’s
dogged denial of the broad scientific consensus on the issue and in part the
availability of compelling images: collapsing ice shelves, vanishing islands, and
anxious polar bears. The complexities of formulating a policy to reduce carbon
emissions may be less photogenic but are equally pivotal to achieving change.
This Part provides a broad overview of climate change regulation, focusing on
those aspects producing its distributional and fiscal effects. Section A describes
the two main competing regulatory structures for reducing carbon emissions.
Section B examines how restricting carbon emissions could exacerbate the
growing income inequality in the U.S. It also assesses the large, structural
federal budget deficit. Section C then explores and rejects economic, political,
and moral arguments for including large subsidies for current emitters in climate
change legislation, as most current proposals do.
A. Market-based Emissions Reduction Legislation
In the past, when government wanted to control consumption of a scarce
commodity, it often would resort to rationing. It commonly imposed price
controls to prevent “profiteering” while limiting the quantities individuals and
businesses could purchase with ration cards. This put the government into the
costly, inefficient, and thankless position of allocating consumption. It also
spawned illicit markets, with high prices, in which the commodity could be
purchased in excess of a consumer’s assigned ration. This was inevitable
because the controlled prices kept demand for the commodity higher than the
available supply.
Apart from a few small groups that regard excessive carbon emission as a
moral wrong that should not be licensed, no one is proposing to reduce carbon
emissions through old-fashioned rationing. Instead, all major plans would
discourage consumption through price increases. This could be arranged in
either of two ways. First, the government could tax carbon emissions directly.
Second, the government could require permits for emissions and set a finite cap
on the number it would issue. Recipients of these permits then could sell them to
others desiring to generate more emissions than their present stock of permits
would allow. In this “cap-and-trade” system, the government would specify the
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total amount of emissions but the market would determine how those emissions
would be distributed, with the most economically productive users presumably
outbidding and supplanting low-value emitters.
A cap-and-trade system can be designed to mimic a carbon tax. Both systems
reduce consumption while allowing the market to clear by raising the cost of
emitting (and of the goods and services an emitting activity produces) to reduce
demand. If the government auctions permits in a cap-and-trade system, the
proceeds of those price increases will come to it to roughly the same degree they
would under a carbon tax. Economic models can project the level of emissions
reductions a carbon tax of a given amount is likely to achieve; a cap-and-trade
system could issue the same number of permits. Regulators can approximate the
carbon tax’s flexibility by auctioning more permits when the price of its initial
offering exceeds one specified level and by refusing to sell even the full intended
number of permits should the auction price fall below another set figure.
A carbon tax has significant advantages over a cap-and-trade regime as a
strategy for addressing climate change. It is likely to have lower administrative
costs and raise fewer definitional issues. It also may be less subject to evasion:
the marginal savings from avoiding the carbon tax will be lower, and hence
create weaker incentives for fraud, than those of unpermitted emissions. It would
provide continuous pressure for further emissions reductions rather than
depending on an arbitrary decision about how many permits to issue. And it
would allow emissions to rise during economic booms, when opportunities for
highly productive activities abound, with offsetting reductions during recessions.
Nonetheless, the political fall-out from President Clinton’s failed 1993 BTU
tax proposal,16 and the Republican Party’s strong anti-tax rhetoric, make carbon
taxes less attractive to many politicians. The 2008 campaign proposals of John
McCain and Hillary Clinton for a gas tax “holiday” during peak driving months
illustrates the sensitivity of carbon taxes: both had among the strongest climate
change proposals in their respective parties, yet price increases far less than those
needed for meaningful emissions reductions spurred them to propose cutting the
one modest carbon tax we have. Not surprisingly, then, cap-and-trade proposals
have heavily dominated the debate to date.
B. Distributional and Fiscal Consequences of Emissions Controls
With the possible exception of sweeping health care reform, climate change
control is likely to be the most important economic legislation in at least a
generation. It will leave no sector of the economy untouched. This already has
produced a flurry of rent-seeking and special-interest pleading. Carbon
emissions regulation also will profoundly affect three aspects of macroeconomic
performance: growth, the distribution of income and wealth, and fiscal balance.
Only the first of those has received prominent attention to date. Subsection 1
identifies the peculiar vulnerability of low-income people and people of color to
16
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increases in carbon costs. Subsection 2 describes the severe long-term imbalance
in the federal budget.
1. Emissions Restrictions’ Impact on Low-Income People and People
of Color
The gap between rich and poor in the United States is growing rapidly. This
can be seen from changes at both ends of the income scale. The top one percent
of households’ income rose 61.8 percent during the last economic expansion,
from 2002 to 2007; during the same four years, the income of the bottom ninety
percent of households rose just 3.9 percent.17 That left the top one percent with
the highest share of national income since 1928: fully one in five dollars of
income went to these households.18 More than three-quarters of all income gains
in the country went to the top ten percent of households.19 Income inequality has
been growing for the past three decades, in sharp contrast to the thirty years after
World War II, during which income gains were widely shared and inequality
dropped.
Although poverty commonly drops during booms and rises during
slowdowns, the poverty rate rose during 2007, the last year of the recent
economic expansion. That year, 12.5 percent of the U.S. population, or 37.3
million people, lived in poverty.20 The poverty rate was for children was
eighteen percent, with almost eight percent living below half of the poverty
line.21 Fully one in five people living in a family with pre-school children was
poor.22 The poverty rates for African Americans and Latinos both exceeded
twenty percent.23 More than fifty million people lived below 125% of the
poverty line.24 Last year, as the recession set in, the poverty rates jumped to 13.2
percent,25 with almost fifty-four million people living below or near the poverty
line.26
Already, disproportionate energy costs are taking a heavy toll on low-income
families. Families forced to prioritize heating bills are cutting back on food and
other necessities.27 When energy prices rose 42.1% from 2000 to 2005, families
17
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with annual incomes between $15,000 and $30,000 reduced their food spending
by ten percent.28 High energy costs have wide-ranging impacts on low-income
families’ well-being: children in homes where energy costs consume a high
share of income are more likely to be in poor health, to have a history of
hospitalization, to be at risk for developmental problems, and to have insufficient
food.29
Most proposals to reduce carbon emissions have regressive income as well as
cost implications. A carbon tax, or an equivalent carbon permitting system,
would raise the costs of some forms of economic activity, such as basic
manufacturing, that disproportionately provide relatively unskilled jobs for which
low-income people can compete. Higher carbon costs would have much more
moderate effects on high-skilled workers and, indeed, would lead to job growth
in many engineering and related fields.
In addition, research finds that African-Americans are especially vulnerable to
increases in the costs of carbon emissions. Although African Americans as a
group generate about one-fifth less per capita carbon emissions than whites,30 on
average they spend a higher proportion of their incomes on energy than does the
rest of the population.31 Part of the reason is that energy costs consume a larger
share of the incomes of impoverished households and, as noted, African
Americans are much more likely to be poor.32 Even controlling for income,
however, African Americans spend a higher share of their incomes on energy.33
This may reflect wealth inequality, which is far greater even than income
inequality:34 African Americans are far more likely than whites to rent, and
landlords are far less likely than homeowners to invest in weatherization and
energy-saving appliances.35
2. The Long-Term Fiscal Imbalance
Before the recent recession and financial crisis, the Bush Administration made
much of reports claiming that the budget deficit was declining. The notion that
the country was running any deficit so far into an economic recovery is troubling.
Now that the worst recession since the 1930s has driven down revenues and led
to automatic and discretionary spending increases to stimulate the economy, the
deficit has reasserted itself at the center of public debates. According to the
bipartisan Concord Coalition, balancing the budget in 2016 while continuing the
ENERGY INSECURITY ON CHILDREN’S HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND LEARNING 3 (2007) [hereinafter CSNAP, FUTURE FUEL].
28
Id. at 2.
29
Id. at 4.
30
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UNEQUAL BURDEN 68-69 (2004), available at http://www.cbcfinc.org/pdf/AAClim_chg_final.pdf
[hereinafter CBC FOUNDATION].
31
Id. at 79.
32
Id. at 36.
33
Id. at 70.
34
MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 91-125 (1995).
35
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2001 and 2003 tax cuts would require cutting Social Security by 43%, cutting
Medicare by 54%, cutting defense by two-thirds, or cutting every other program
in the federal budget—from aid to education to food stamps to national parks to
overseas embassies—by an average of 30%.36
More recent estimates from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and CBO show budget deficits rising to near-record levels due to the economic
slowdown.37 Governments choose to run deficits during downturns to stimulate
the economy, but much of these deficits result from policies adopted long before
the recession rather than deliberate counter-cyclical interventions.
If anything, the longer-term budget outlook is even worse. Politicians wax
dour about the fiscal impact of the baby-boomers’ retirement, yet Social Security
contributes a relatively modest amount to the long-term deficit picture, rising
from the current four percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to a bit more than
five percent by 2030, after which it stabilizes.38 Far more serious is the impact of
health care inflation on Medicare and Medicaid spending.39
Deficits of this size are unsustainable. At some point, investors become
unwilling to buy any more public debt, forcing the government to finance its
operations by printing money and igniting inflation.40 Even before that point is
reached, government deficits crowd out private investment by consuming the
available capital supply and slow the economy by raising interest rates.41
Any measures to narrow the deficit would increase drag on the economy. In
addition, taxes inevitably have behavioral effects, raising the costs of some
activities relative to others.42 Most affect socially desirable behavior, such as
work and savings. A carbon tax, or an auction of emitting permits, offers a rare
revenue-raising opportunity whose behavioral effects are desirable. It thus would
mitigate the deflationary effects of deficit reduction better than other available
means. These effects are not wholly benign: as noted above, they would dampen
economic activity and cost jobs in many industries. Raising the cost of carbon
emissions nonetheless is far superior to other plausible means of reducing the
deficit.
By contrast, if the federal government spends or rebates the proceeds of a
carbon tax or permit auction—either explicitly by giving away emitting permits
at below-market rates—it will have to layer on an additional round of taxes or
spending cuts to cope with the deficit. The Republican Party’s defining
opposition to taxes, and the Democratic Party’s skittishness on the subject, make
36
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37
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a second round of tax increases unlikely. And if the proceeds of carbon
emissions regulation are to be spent at the same time other spending is being cut
to reduce the deficit, the net effect will be to shift spending from existing
programs to those climate change legislation favors.
This country’s massive structural deficits have important distributional
implications. In the simplest terms, deficits transfer wealth from the nation as a
whole to bondholders, a disproportionately affluent group. More broadly, lowincome children’s lack of political power typically means that programs that
serve them suffer disproportionately in budget cut legislation;43 budgetary
procedures ensuring that this is the case have won bipartisan support.44 One of
the major political priorities is doggedly defending almost all tax preferences for
the affluent; its opponent supports many of those tax preferences, too, and is far
more ambivalent and selective in its defense of spending programs that benefit
low-income people. The one large new tax sometimes discussed in the context of
deficit reduction—a consumption or value-added tax—would be sharply
regressive. This dynamic ensures that, if left alone, low-income people are likely
to be asked to pay a disproportionate share of the costs of deficit reduction.
Large deficits also transfer wealth between generations. The standard political rhetoric about “burdening our children with debt” is too simplistic:45 of
course we also bequeath them all of the good things in our civilization.
Accumulating debt so that we can cure disease or make other productive social
investments is entirely consistent with a conscientious regard for future
generations; most obviously, future generations depend upon us for their
educations, which are costly.46
Passing on huge debt incurred to finance contemporary consumption is
another matter. Our forebears produced much of our current wealth, likely
intending it to benefit all of their successors rather than just us. Leaving future
generations an economy incapable of rewarding their efforts to the same degree
that it did ours breaches a fiduciary duty we owe to our descendents on behalf of
our ancestors.
Many environmentalists rely on similar arguments of
intergenerational equity to criticize wasteful exploitation of natural resources.47
C. The Weak Case for Large Corporate Subsidies
The stampede to include large corporate subsidies in any climate control
legislation is unwise and unnecessary. This section shows why. Subsection 1
43
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rebuts the perceived political inevitability of including large corporate subsidies
in climate change legislation. Subsection 2 demonstrates that compensating
business owners for their losses due to carbon emissions regulation is neither
possible nor desirable and that any attempt to do so could seriously distort
laudable economic signals.
1. The Politics of Corporate Subsidies
Including large corporate subsidies in climate change legislation is politically
unnecessary. Although opponents of regulating greenhouse gases will seek to
retain leverage over the final policy by refusing to concede formally, they have
decisively lost the public debate, and they know it. They do not need to be
bought off: no meaningful climate change regulation has been possible under
President Bush, but both of his possible successors are committed to finding a
way to come to grips with this issue. In this regard, a crucial distinction exists
between issues that can only be addressed during fleeting periods of public
salience—such as poverty, which quickly dropped from the public consciousness
after Hurricane Katrina—and those with an entrenched place in the public
agenda. Because global warming’s effects are so numerous and widespread, and
because they implicate numerous widely shared middle-class values, it faces little
risk of receding from the political agenda. The political explosion that rising
gasoline prices ignited counsels a measured phase-in of the new regulatory
regime, but it also is likely to transform attitudes toward conservation: within a
few years, the number of voters with Hummers and SUVs will shrink to political
insignificance.
Procedurally, proponents of climate change regulation have little need to fear
obstructionism from a minority loyal to rent-seeking business interests. Thus,
they need not offer business subsidies to purchase the supermajority in the Senate
that other progressive initiatives commonly require. Once they have cost
estimates from CBO and the Joint Committee on Taxation for climate change
legislation—without corporate subsidies—a majority supporting that legislation
can reflect those increased revenues in the targets in the congressional budget
resolution.48 They similarly can include a “reconciliation instruction” in the
budget resolution that requires the committees with jurisdiction over the
legislation to produce additional revenues in that amount.49 The budget
resolution is immune to Senate filibusters and requires only a simple majority to
pass.50 Once such a budget resolution is adopted, any amendments that would
lower the legislation’s revenue yield below the specified levels by diverting
funds to subsidize emitters would be subject to a point of order that only sixty
48
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senators’ votes could overrule.51 Moreover, the reconciliation instructions would
compel the committees of jurisdiction to report out legislation achieving the
specified revenues or subject themselves to a privileged amendment by the chair
of the Budget Committee to modify their bill to correct any shortfall.52 The
resulting “reconciliation” bill is itself immune from filibusters, requiring only a
bare majority of the Senate.53
The failure of climate change legislation on the Senate floor in 2008 does not
change this calculus. With the House leadership showing no interest in
considering the bill should it pass, and President Bush poised to veto it, senators
had no reason to expend political capital on a merely symbolic vote.
In fact, excluding large corporate subsidies could actually improve the
prospects for meaningful legislation to control climate change. A fiscally
prudent and distributionally sensitive proposal could broadly expand the coalition
of support. Since the end of the New Deal era, the progressive agenda in this
country has become increasingly fragmented, divided between those with
domestic and international orientations, between those with substantive and
proceduralist programs, and across a plethora of issue areas. Environmentalism
has secured a justifiably privileged place on that agenda, but diversifying its
support to include the anti-poverty movement and “good government” advocates
of fiscal rectitude could significantly reduce competition for progressive political
capital and financial support. A key to strengthening political environmentalism
is establishing its relevance to low-income people feeling hard-pressed by
problems that seem more immediate.54 Conversely, environmentalism needs to
avoid the perception that it is a socially or racially insensitive agenda of the
affluent.55
2. The Economics of Corporate Subsidies
The economic case for building large corporate subsidies into a regime of
climate change regulation is startlingly weak. It thus is a worthy companion to
the junk science that the same industries have funded to dispute the relationship
between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.
First, increasing prices for carbon-based energy consumption through a
carbon tax or a cap-and-trade permitting regime will only modestly impact
emitters’ profitability. These regimes reduce demand for this form of energy and
thus the sales of the companies producing it. The extent of the profits foregone
on these sales is, however, a complicated question. Many producers may have
marginal costs that rise at such a rate that the last several units sold provide
almost no profits. For example, the new regime may cause companies to
51
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abandon marginally profitable efforts to extract oil and gas from the sea bed.
CBO estimates that fully compensating existing emitters for losses under a
carbon emissions control regime would require less than fifteen percent of the
proceeds of a carbon tax or of the emissions permits issued under a cap-and-trade
system, a small fraction of what they would receive under most current
proposals.
Even this estimate, however, likely is considerably overstated. Many
companies producing energy from fossil fuels also have large holdings in noncarbon-based energy sources or in technologies to increase energy efficiency.
These holdings will appreciate significantly in the new regime, offsetting any
losses from the companies’ carbon-based businesses.56 Even those companies
not currently active may be well-positioned—e.g., with distribution and
marketing networks—to seize commanding positions in those markets.
Depending on a particular company’s portfolio, the new regulatory regime may
bring it net gains, net losses, or little change at all in value. Subsidizing all
existing emitters with free permits or tax cuts thus would provide windfalls to
some companies that already are profiting from the change. Yet any effort to
limit subsidies to those companies actually losing money would punish other
firms for making prudent, and socially beneficial, investments.
Moreover, compensating those actually losing money due to climate change
policy is quite impossible. As scientific evidence, public concern, and political
will around global warming strengthened, the chances of regulation increased
and the markets reduced the value of emitters’ stocks accordingly. Those that
sold stock since this process begun have already absorbed some of the emitting
company’s expected losses before the regulatory regime was even in place.
Identifying them and calculating their losses would be infeasible and pointless:
the risk of government regulation, like the risk of changing consumer tastes,
increased competition, and, indeed, environmental catastrophe is just one more
factor affecting profitability that the markets handle quite efficiently. Indeed,
markets can handle regulatory risk with particular efficiency because regulatory
regimes take shape relatively gradually and transparently, allowing investors
plenty of opportunity to respond.57 Risk-averse investors protect themselves by
56
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diversifying their portfolios; risk-loving investors stand to make windfalls if
events turn out to favor their investments and have no special claim to sympathy
when the winds blow the other way.
Conversely, those holding shares in a given emitter at the time the regulations
take effect will include many that bought in at discounted prices after the
prospect of regulation became clear. They have no plausible claim to
compensation when the expected regulatory regime does in fact come about: the
prospect of that regime allowed them to buy into the company cheaply.
Providing free permits to historical emitters would give these investors unmerited
windfalls. As suggested above, some of the companies that stand to lose the
most are those that have failed over the years to diversify into cleaner energy
sources. All current stockholders in such companies either owned stock when
those decisions were made—and may have benefited in the form of larger
dividends—or bought in later after the companies’ policies were established (and
presumably reflected in market prices). Neither group has any claim to be
rescued from the effects of its investment decisions.
More generally, distributing valuable commodities free of charge to
businesses puts the government in the position of picking winners in the market.
That rarely is a prescription for an efficient result. Corporate subsidies that a
national government allocates arbitrarily among its businesses distort competition
both domestically and internationally:58 even if our trading partners also give
away permits, they will be doing so with different stringency or through different
systems altogether. Legislation inevitably will distribute permits based on what
companies’ emissions were in the past (because that amount is known), not what
they would have been in the affected years absent regulation. Some emissions
permits will prop up inefficient companies that were failing in the market.
Conversely, some fast-rising, highly innovative companies will be placed at a
competitive disadvantage with an allocation of permits that fails to reflect their
trajectories. To be sure, they can purchase additional permits to sustain their
growth, but requiring them to pay for what their less efficient competitors get for
free will distort the results of market competition.59
Perhaps most importantly, establishing the political precedent that polluters
must be held harmless in any new regulatory regime will do long-term harm to
environmental quality. The economics of climate change regulation make that
feasible; in other important environmental contexts, it may not be. At a time
when the Court’s expanding definition of regulatory takings of real property is
frustrating environmental land use controls,60 it is difficult to understand why
63 (2002) (describing many people’s inability to comprehend and respond to low probabilities of
harm as “probability neglect”).
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environmentalists would want to establish a de facto principle of compensation
for profits lost due to emissions limits. Even in the land use context, amortizetion—allowing a prior usage a number of years to phase out—is accepted as
obviating the need for just compensation, despite the financial losses that remain.
All serious proposals would phase in restrictions on carbon emissions, providing
the same sort of relief to current emitters that takings law offers to those losing
important interest in land. International climate control regimes similarly would
have little prospect of effectiveness if they had to compensate current highemitting countries for potential limitations on their lifestyles.61
In fact, the contrary principle—that environmentally damaging lines of
business risk regulatory interventions—is a far more desirable one. The political
process’s limits ensure that many significant environmental hazards will go
unregulated, under-regulated, or belatedly regulated. Industry and investors,
however, cannot predict reliably which will be regulated and, if so, how. If
regulation would bring uncompensated costs, this uncertainty will reduce the
expected profitability of environmentally damaging activities. A company
deciding between two possible fields for expansion, one of which engenders
environmental harms, one of which does not, will become more likely to pursue
the “greener” line of business because it faces less risk that its investment will
prematurely cease producing returns. Similarly, the market will reduce the value
of the securities of firms engaged in environmentally problematic activities. The
effect is similar to that which causes companies to hesitate to put money into
countries with recent histories of violent insurrections because they fear losing
their investments.
Deterring environmentally unsound investments is highly efficient, both
economically and politically. It weeds out environmental harms with the fewest
offsetting benefits. This incremental degradation of the value to reflect
regulatory risk is not contingent on the arbitrary line-drawing in any specific
regulatory regime, thus escaping both a common source of economic inefficiency
in regulations and the dangers of industry capture of a particular regulatory
agency. And by clearing away the harms with the least compelling economic
rationales, this deterrence frees the environmental movement to focus its political
capital on restricting hazards associated with more economically productive
activity. Holding current emitters harmless for economic losses under any
climate change policy dissipates this desirable regulatory uncertainty: companies
and investors can continue to pursue environmentally hazardous practices in the
expectation that they either will be allowed to continue those activities or will be
compensated—perhaps even over-compensated—for any required cessation.
The adverse consequences of carbon emissions long have been well-known.
If one were to approach this problem as one of corrective justice, surely the
argument that past emitters should bear the costs of the environmental harm they
61
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caused is far more compelling than any that they should be compensated for
being restrained from doing still more harm in the future.
III. Determining the Scope of the Climate Change Debate
Discrediting the currently popular arguments for corporate subsidies does not
guarantee that distributional and fiscal considerations will help shape climate
change policy. Any legislation likely to win enactment inevitably will neglect
many important issues with clear connections to climate change. No policy
initiative can respond even to all legitimate and important social problems. Bills
that seek to address numerous, marginally related concerns are derided as
“Christmas trees;” they often aggregate the complexities, side disputes, and
enemies of their various pieces and collapse. On the other hand, we hear
increasingly about the supposed “law of unintended consequences,” typically
when someone devises an initiative focusing myopically on only a subset of its
implications.
For example, vast sums are needed to repair the nation’s bridges, tunnels, rail
beds, schools, and other physical infrastructure. Climate change likely is
exacerbating this problem, subjecting structures to stresses their designers did not
anticipate. Devoting the proceeds of a carbon tax or permit sales to infrastructure
repair will rule out significant deficit reduction and could crowd out low-income
offsets. Advocates need some principle on which to convince sincere policymakers sympathetic to claims for infrastructure spending to nonetheless privilege
protecting low-income people and the public fisc in climate change legislation.
In other words, this article’s proposals must not only establish their cardinal
merit as worthy public policies but must also show their ordinal superiority to
other worthy policies in a competition for scarce space on the climate change
agenda. Resolving this kind of ordinal question requires tools beyond those
commonly employed in analysis of public law problems.62
This problem will not solve itself. Some environmentalists have embraced
addressing fiscal rectitude and, in particular, distributional justice in climate
change legislation. Others, however, may have little interest in privileging these
social concerns because they adhere to a non-anthropocentric ethic,63 whatever
the political cost.64 Pragmatic environmentalists have learned from hard
experience the importance of compromising with industry65 and are loath to walk
away from such a strategy. Still others see climate change legislation as a oncein-a-lifetime source of dedicated support for a host of projects that would
struggle for funding in the appropriations process. Absent a clear, principled
62
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basis for privileging the protection of low-income people and deficit reduction
over these important claims indigenous to the environmental advocacy
community, low-income people and the public fisc are unlikely to receive
meaningful attention.
This Part seeks a principled basis for determining whether climate change
legislation’s sponsors and other supporters should privilege admission of
distributional and fiscal considerations into that debate. This inquiry into
political joinder will attempt to discern defensible norms without becoming
unconnected from actors’ practice in the actual world.66 This avoids the
difficulties inherent in making the case for a particular arrangement without
offering a theory of how entrenched interests can be compelled to submit to the
redistribution necessary to achieve it.67 Section A seeks to understand the
process by which the political system decides which arguably related issues to
admit to a political debate, such as that concerning climate change, and derives
normative rules to guide those decisions. Section B applies those criteria to show
that concerns about distributive justice have a powerful claim for inclusion in
climate change policy debates in particular. Section C then applies these
principles again to demonstrate that fiscal probity, too, ought to play a major role
in designing climate change regulation.
A. Policy Issue Joinder in a Complex World
In recent years, students of the political process have paid increasing attention
to questions of framing. Proposals framed in one manner may draw broad
acclamation even though, presented slightly differently, they might be ignored or
actively scorned. Kenneth Arrow demonstrated that association with other
proposals is one of the most important forms of framing, showing that the
inclusion of a third option can shift the results of a debate between two
alternatives.68 Proponents of the original legislation may legitimately fear
inclusion of any new proposals in the debate may generate a different outcome
even if preferences on the original proposal do not change.69
This section analyzes conflict over which issues may be joined with which
others, either formally in a legislative body or informally as part of a public
debate. It seeks to derive broadly acceptable principles both from analysis of the
politics of issue joinder and from analogous bodies of law. Subsection 1 begins
with an examination of groups’ motives for seeking to join two public policy
proposals into a single initiative. Subsection 2 explores the forms that groups’
conflict over joinder of policy proposals can take. Subsection 3 surveys
66
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legislative bodies’ rules on issue joinder, finding most conceptually
underdeveloped and normatively unappealing. Subsection 4 seeks to draw
analogies to joinder rules in litigation, particularly the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Subsection 5 looks at the reasons initiatives’ sponsors commonly
decline to broaden policy debates into directions they favor substantively.
Finally, subsection 6 proposes a set of principles for issue joinder in public policy
debates adapted from those in civil litigation to address the different motives for
and consequences of joinder in the policy arena.
1. Motives for Seeking to Join Policy Issues
Sometimes political actors’ reasons for seeking to merge a second issue with
one already under consideration have nothing to do with the merits of the
proposed amendment. An initiative’s sponsor may insert an unrelated provision
to expand its popularity. This is the essence of log-rolling. Conversely,
legislation’s opponents may seek to add a “poison pill” that will destroy its
political viability.70 Both of these strategies depend on reaching a point at which
the forum’s rules will force an up-or-down decision and the entire package either
advances or fails; without such decisional rules, neither would accomplish much.
As a result, where either of these motives is at work, joinder of policy issues
looks fundamentally different from joinder in civil or criminal litigation, whose
rules generally allow for split judgments. To the extent that the theoretical
literature has considered issue joinder in the policy world at all, it has largely
been with regard to these two motives. Legislative bodies’ joinder rules largely
address the degree to which members may logroll or insert poison pills.
Two other motives, however, may animate joinder efforts. One relates only to
the merits of the proposed amendment; the other concerns the interrelationship
between the two. These raise much more complex issues. Both are more
important to determining the scope of climate change legislation.
a. The Struggle for Salience
A large number of issues arise in our complex social and economic
environment, but only a tiny fraction have the characteristics to achieve political
salience.71 The competition among nascent issues is akin to Darwinian
competition for scarce resources.72 Issues typically have extremely short life
spans within which to affect social change or face extinction.73 Issues also fail
when they lose public attention, either immediately or after achieving modest
gains.74 Only the rarest of issues is able to reorder the political system to give
itself long-term salience.75
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Four processes give issues salience: important external disruptions of the
established order (such as crises or watershed elections), the energetic
sponsorship of prominent politicians, adaptation from old issues that have lost
their salience, and the resolution of persistent tensions within the established
order.76 Although change sometimes comes in a single transformative moment,
such as an election, it more often occurs in a gradual process of evolution, or in
an alternation of between periods of gradual and sudden change.77
Because the means of achieving salience are scarce, those that have been
unable to garner prominence on their own may become desperate. Attaching
their initiative to another that has achieved salience may seem vital to avoid
political oblivion. Riding along with an already-viable proposal may require less
political capital, both because the amendment can enter the policy-making
process in mid-stream78 and because the underlying proposal’s champions are
likely to continue working to move it forward.
On the other hand, the sponsors of the initiative subject to amendment have
strong reasons to resist amendments that lack logrolling potential. Issues fail to
move public policy when they become associated with, and mired in,
longstanding conflicts that have no clear winner.79
b. Responding to Externalities
A great deal of policymaking inevitably is unidimensional. The health
department inspects restaurants with single-minded determination to prevent
food-borne illnesses; the inspector does nothing to ensure that the restaurant is
paying its taxes. We ticket motorists running red lights to prevent collisions but
do not inspect stopped motorists’ emissions control equipment. We require
truthful labels on products to prevent consumers from being deceived; only
occasionally do those enforcement efforts extend to the value of truthfullypresented contents.
In our increasingly complex and interconnected world, however, more and
more policies have multiple effects. The value of these policies is the sum of
their many effects, which may include both positive and negative ones. A major
focus of several contemporary legal intellectual movements has been to highlight
previously neglected ancillary effects of policies.80 Failing to address those sideeffects in the same legislation gives them a head start causing harm and risks
having the political process lose interest before enacting a corrective.
76

Id. at 153.
Id. at 158-60.
78
For example, a successful floor amendment avoids the committee process altogether. Even an
amendment in committee frees its sponsor from the need to motivate the chair to call a meeting on
the proposal. Some legislative bodies have rules seeking to deny initiatives the opportunities of late
entry into the deliberative process. Congressional rules prohibit conference reports from including
items that appeared in neither House nor Senate bill. Some states have deadlines for introducing
bills that are to be considered in a given legislative session.
79
Carmines & Stimson, supra note 71, at 156-57.
80
For example, economists highlight rent control’s consequences for the rental housing stock’s
maintenance; feminists identify the subjugating effects of policies built around male models of
interpersonal relations.
77

21

Yet even if an initiative’s supporters recognize its problematic side-effects,
they may nonetheless oppose incorporating corrective measures. The more
complexity they admit into their initiative, the more risk of political or procedural
problems. A fair measure of the strength of someone’s commitment to particular
goals is which the other claims that she or he is willing to allow to override those
goals.81 Recognizing too many claims as sufficient to override an asserted right
largely vitiates that right.82 Accordingly, champions of a particular cause tend to
resist admitting new claims into political debates on that cause. Thus, for
example, climate change concerns’ salience can be discerned from their success
in trumping other important policies. These can include directly countervailing
concerns, such as the purported reliance interests of current emitters or tradebased objections to state subsidization of renewable energy sources.83 The policy
concerns environmentalists seek to subordinate to carbon emissions reductions
also may include causes that are not intrinsically antagonistic84 but whose
recognition could slow the achievement of carbon emission reductions.
To date, most critiques of heedless policymaking have focused on its
inefficiency: selecting policies based on an incomplete accounting of their
consequences is likely to yield a significant number of miscalibrations or even
erroneous adoptions. Oblivious policymaking also is likely to raise significant
inequities. Not all political actors are equally capable of inducing the political
process to think exclusively about their concerns. Majoritarian democracy tends
to favor weak claims held by large numbers over strong claims held by small
numbers. Interest group politics often reverses that preference, favoring the
claims of small, cohesive groups whose individual stakes are strong enough to
prompt organizing. Claims held by small groups that do not have the means to
function as an effective interest group, however, are disadvantaged in both
systems. Thus, results that fall far short of Caldor-Hicks optimality are possible
when small, weak groups are strongly affected. Public interest policymaking
should take into account these likely aggregate distortions in the political process.
2. Patterns of Political Conflict over Issue Joinder
A normative framework for deciding questions of issue joinder in policy
debates is not absolutely necessary. The difficulty of designing a universally
applicable and normatively compelling rule of joinder is possible could justify
adopting a laissez-faire position. Those initiating a proposal would invite joinder
with others that they support on the merits or expect to help their ideas prevail.
Initiatives’ opponents conversely would seek to join it with divisive or
embarrassing ideas but keep it apart from popular ones. Those fearing
81

DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 91-92.
Id. at 92.
83
Mercedes Fernández Armenteros, State Aid Issues Raised by Implementation of Climate Change
Policy Instruments, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 219, 229-36 (Michael Bothe & Eckhard Rehbinder
eds., 2005).
84
Some environmentalists have expressed concern that offsetting the effects on low-income people
of carbon cost increases could reduce conservation and thus undermine their initiative’s goals. As
Part IV demonstrates infra, however, a well-designed low-income offset program need not have
that effect.
82

22

unpleasant externalities, and policy entrepreneurs struggling to achieve salience,
could try to claw their way into the debate. Coalition partners, policymakers,
journalists, and the public might join or sever issues to improve efficiency of
consideration, although they also might manipulate joinder to conceal their
choices on the merits. This would lead to considerable ad hoc political
bargaining. For example, if an initiative’s sponsors’ resistance to joining another
proposal to theirs sufficiently alienates late-arriving allies, the latter could
threaten to withdraw support.
In practice, this is likely to lead to considerable miscalculation, with some
initiatives failing despite clear majority support due to solvable joinder disputes
and others causing preventable negative side effects because their supporters
feared triggering an internecine battle if they “opened up” the legislation. More
generally, political actors seek to assess one another’s good faith when building
relationships; the paucity of standards for issue joinder in policy debates
frustrates that process.
Complicating the problem of determining the scope of a particular debate is
the likelihood that an initiative’s originators may disagree with, or value much
more lightly, the concerns underlying proffered additions to their proposal. The
originators may feel some sweat equity in their initiative and regard efforts to
broaden the debate as an illegitimate redistribution of political capital they have
earned. Even if it could somehow be established that expanding the initiative’s
scope would increase the aggregate wealth of society as a whole, or of a broad
political community with which the originators may identify—progressives,
conservatives, libertarians, or whatever—they are likely to vigorously reject any
duty to seek that end.85 People that are highly altruistic in their personal lives—
and whose altruism drives their politically activism—may feel justified or even
compelled to act as egoistical hedonists on behalf of their cause. Arranging
cooperation thus can be most difficult.
In such a case, one might imagine some sort of Coasean bargaining in which
the would-be intervenors would rebate to the originators some portion of the
benefit their cause receives from being admitted to the debate.86 Such
bargaining, however, is impractical, both because the diffuse coalitions on both
sides make transaction costs prohibitively high and because the benefits the
joining cause receives come in a form difficult for its advocates to transfer.87
And even if such a bargain could be struck, it would largely preserve the
preexisting distribution of political capital.88 In some instances, that prior
arrangement may strike policy-makers as sufficiently unjust to call for a forced
redistribution, either by their own hand or by allowing the interveners to exercise
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self-help. More generally, although a policy initiative’s authors may claim
proprietary rights, its success depends on a broader array of supporters whose
interests and preferences have some claim to recognition.
Further complexity arises when several Table 1: Strategies for Determining
groups wish to join their proposals with a single Scope of a Public Policy Initiative
(pay-offs listed for strategy in row first)
initiative. That initiative may be able to survive
Pursue
Insist on
the additional complexity and controversy
Separate
Inclusion
Initiative
resulting from inclusion of any one of the
proffered amendments but not the cumulative Pursue
4,4
2,6
weight of them all. Any that are not added, Separate
Initiative
however, will have difficulty gaining salience Insist on
on their own. As Table 1 suggests, the Inclusion
6,2
0,0
interaction between advocates seeking inclusion
of different issues in a policy initiative with apparent momentum can be loosely
modeled as a game of chicken.89 The best outcome for each group is for it to win
inclusion in the initiative while its counterpart goes off to attempt to mount a new
initiative of its own. Each group’s worst nightmare, however, is that both tie
their fates to the existing initiative and, in so doing, overload and collapse it. If a
group is going to pursue an independent initiative, it generally prefers that the
other group do the same, allowing the prior initiative to win approval more easily
and leaving more capital unspent in the broader community of shared political
interests in which the two groups operate. As a result, each group has a strong
interest in misleading the other about its intentions: if one group can persuade
the other that it is determined to insist on inclusion, it can scare off the
competition and enjoy an easy path to enactment. This process obviously is
prone to miscalculations. It also may produce distributionally undesirable
results, with groups in more desperate straits less willing to risk certain defeat by
continuing to struggle for inclusion.90
A common means of obtaining more cooperative outcomes to political games
is repeated playing.91 Many social causes and political organizations, certainly
those concerned with the environment, with poverty, and with fiscal discipline,
are repeat players. The vagaries of politics make it difficult for many groups to
predict whether they will wear the originator’s or intervener’s hat the next time
the scope of an initiative must be determined. This might seem to provide each
an incentive to follow the course that would maximize aggregate well-being if
universally pursued over the long term, acting selfishly only when the expected
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gains of doing so exceed the expected costs of others acting similarly in future
encounters.
In practice, this approach is likely to produce only modest results. First, many
groups find themselves in one or another position a disproportionate share of the
time. A group that originates politically powerful initiatives most of the time will
not sacrifice much to accommodate those that habitually struggle for salience.
Second, the stakes of each interaction are not constant. Varying stakes, and
varying degrees of transparency, tend to undermine the corrective benefits of
repeated interactions.92 The base initiatives’ political strength, the prospective
amendments’ chances for achieving salience independently, and their relative
importance to their respective sponsors all will vary considerably. Finally, some
groups’ accountability structures may place a higher premium on visibly “trying”
than on actually achieving success.93
Aggregation of preferences among many diverse interest groups is likely to be
difficult. Neither extreme position may be stable: those with significant
additional concerns will unite to oppose a “clean” bill, while none will want it
weighed down with so many extraneous items that the bill sinks. Which
combination of proposals are admitted will depend on the order in which they are
advanced and various groups’ strategic judgments about which proposals to
tolerate and which to oppose.94 Even if a stable equilibrium exists, the
participants are unlikely to be aware of it, allowing other outcomes to prevail
depending on how the agenda is manipulated.95
Metaphors of community also are unavailing. Analysis of coalition dynamics
among multiple players typically assume that the most salient issues can be
specified.96 When that is not the case, interactions may become more chaotic.
Discrete political bodies and communities typically have leaders who set their
agendas with reference to agreed criteria of fairness.97 Agenda-setting is much
more complex for the nation as a whole, for the set of interest groups that lobby
Congress, and that subset of interest groups that plausibly claim to be pursuing a
progressive or altruistic agenda (whatever that may be). The national electorate
has relatively clear bounds, identified leaders, and some limits to its agenda set
the Constitution. Interest groups, on the other hand, can form any number of
combinations, are unlikely to have consensus leaders, and may not interact
enough to have established meaningful criteria for fairness in agenda
formulation. Communities maintain norms through complex systems of
signaling that require repeated interactions among the same individuals.98 These
break down when membership in the community becomes transient.99 Perhaps
92
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some interest groups work with one another so regularly that they may evolve
agreed practices for amending one another’s initiatives. Amendments seeking to
contain initiatives’ undesirable externalities, almost by definition, often will
come from those outside the political community responsible for the initiative.
3. Explicit Legislative Regulation of Issue Joinder
Positive law generally offers little guidance on issue joinder in policy debates.
Legislative bodies have a wide variety of joinder rules, few of which have much
normative appeal. Most take one of four basic types: extremely permissive
joinder,100 extremely restrictive joinder,101 joinder subject to some test of
germaneness,102 or joinder at the whim of the majority party.103 These rules
largely respond to attempts at joinder motivated by support for or hostility to the
underlying proposal.104 They thus reflect little considered thought about
amendments offered to gain salience or to control externalities in the underlying
bill. Moreover, those regimes that depend on germaneness—the only ones that
attempt to balance the interests of the sponsors of the original bill and of the
amendment—have had great difficulty devising a generally applicable
100
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definition.105 Indeed, the normative basis and practical utility of the germaneness
standard is unclear: under some definitions, it may tend to favor amendments
that address externalities springing from the underlying proposal, but it offers
only limited protection against logrolling and almost none against cleverly
designed poison pills.
Perhaps the most thoughtful are the U.S. Senate’s rules regulating
consideration of budget reconciliation legislation. Recognizing that the goal of
fiscal rectitude may motivate votes for broad packages but provide senators
insufficient cover to support particular tax increases or spending cuts, the rules
generally obstruct the disaggregation of legislation on the floor.106 On the other
hand, cognizant of the dangers of broad joinder, the rules generally prohibit nonbudgetary matters from riding along.107 These rules make sense for singlemindedly accomplishing deficit reduction in that they deliberately inhibit
consideration of unintended consequences. Thus they, too, are difficult to
generalize to the broad range of policy debates in which most participants are
willing to consider more than one set of consequences.
4. Learning from Joinder Rules for Litigation
The vast majority of policy analysis focuses on the merits of questions in a
manner analogous to a trial. Questions of evidence’s admissibility and
persuasiveness dominate their factual side, with norms instead of rules of law
driving the decision. A far smaller but still substantial literature has developed
over questions of institutional competency: arguments that a particular unit of
government should not adopt a substantively meritorious policy because it cannot
implement it effectively, because another public entity has primary responsibility
for the problem, or because the initiative would violate some broader principle of
restraint. These debates are closely analogous to those over courts’ jurisdiction
to decide pieces of litigation. Also familiar are controversies over governmental
transparency, the public policy counterpart to discovery battles. More subtly,
attempts to drive public policy with compelling anecdotes, and complaints that
the cited cases are too rare or atypical, bear more than a passing resemblance to
efforts to certify class actions. As noted, however, the literature gives relatively
little systematic attention, however, to the problem of joinder in public policy
debates: which issues must be decided with which others.108
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A laissez-faire approach to joinder, allowing raw political power to determine
admission to debates without criticism, would be a sharp departure from civil
litigation’s practice. “The impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible
scope of action, consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties,
and remedies is strongly encouraged.”109 Equity jurisprudence, too, has long
recognized the injustices that can result from considering only one of a set of
related problems: “He who seeks equity must do equity.”110
Although these rules offer valuable insights into fair principles of joinder,
litigation differs from policymaking in four crucial respects. First, in any system,
someone must make a set of default choices about joinder. The obvious choice is
the initiator of the debate. Prosecutors enjoy broad power to shape the
indictment or information. Civil plaintiffs have sweeping authority to frame and
amend the complaint. And the initiators of proposals in the public policy arena
make the first bid for media attention and, in many fora, enjoy broad discretion
what to include in bills. In the legislative process, however, the role of initiator
often changes hands, from a bill’s lead sponsor to a subcommittee chair, then a
full committee chair, then a floor manager, and then members of the legislature’s
other chamber. Each of these successive initiators can and do revise their
predecessors’ joinder decisions.
Second, many public policy processes lack a clear equivalent to the judge in
litigation.111 This could make the default power almost absolute unless clear
norms, with widely accepted legitimacy, dictate otherwise. Thus, litigation rules’
insights about which factors affect the strength of an argument for joinder are
helpful; their highly discretionary structure is less so absent a unitary, impartial
entity to exercise that discretion. Other members of a broader political
community, sympathetic to both combatants but beholden to neither, can play
this role to a point; absent clear norms, however, their decisions are likely to be
fragmented and confused.
Third, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s joinder rules rely heavily upon
party status, a concept with no clear analogue in public policy debates. To be
sure, those involved with a particular issue know with whom they are interacting.
The First Amendment, however, prohibits entry barriers of the kind Rule 24112
imposes on would-be intervenors in civil litigation. Thus, adoption of a principle
comparable to Rule 18,113 allowing any “party” to assert any claim against
another party, would stimulate many pro forma “interventions” for the purpose of
expanding that debate. On the other hand, a group’s on-going engagement in a
109
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debate would strike many as conferring some tentative sweat-equity legitimacy
on its proposals to broaden that debate.
Fourth, the denial of a litigant’s effort to join a claim to an on-going dispute
does not typically prevent the litigant from receiving a decision on the merits.114
In the public policy arena, by contrast, most claims never receive a hearing or decision on the merits. Exclusion from one debate may mean the claim will never
be heard at all.
Finally, and most importantly, joinder decisions in litigation are generally
partial and provisional. A court may try two claims, or two defendants, together,
but it renders judgments separately. Joinder may slow a claim or party’s
adjudication, and may risk the adjudicator confusing two claims or parties, but
judgments remain distinct.115 In litigation, unlike policymaking, the decisionmaker never has to make an all-or-nothing choice concerning joined claims.
One of the most fundamental principles of the Federal Rules, and a revolutionary contrast to their predecessor codes, is that the scope of civil litigation
should depend on the scope of the dispute in the real world rather than on legal
categories.116 Legislative procedure, like common law pleading, takes the opposite position: artificial limits on committees’ jurisdiction largely predetermine
the scope of resulting legislation. Broader public policy debates occupy a somewhat intermediary position: influenced, but not absolutely controlled, by preconceptions about which issues “go together.”
Rule 13(a) requires joinder of most counterclaims that “arise[] out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s
claim”.117 This seeks to include defensive counterclaims in the same case as the
claims to which they respond. Thus, parties whom litigation might harm are
heard on their pleas for palliatives at the same time as the claims against them.118
As discussed below, convention in public policy debates is that groups at risk of
focused losses have a preferred right to participate in those debates to redirect or
ameliorate those burdens. In practice, however, courts often have had great difficulty distinguishing between defensive and affirmative counterclaims in any
principled way.119 Similarly, identifying those potential legislative harms that are
sufficiently focused to convey a preferential right to legislative joinder has
proven quite difficult.
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Because the Federal Rules tie the right to raise new issues to party status, and
make achievement of party status contingent on the claims one would assert or
defends, the rules on joinder of parties provide a fair starting point for analyzing
issue joinder in public policy debates. Rule 24(a)(2) gives the right to intervene
when a prospective party “claims an interest relating to the property or subject
matter of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the intervenor’s ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.”120 This implies a kind of
germaneness analysis built around a vision of litigation’s primary function as
characterizing transactions and property. The functions of policymaking are
more diverse, and more plastic to the whims of initiators. Rule 24(a)(2) also
suggests strong deference to claims of necessity: where an interest is
unrepresented in litigation, and cannot effectively be asserted later, it should be
admitted. Rule 24(b)(2)(B) authorizes the court to allow intervention by any
party whose claim or defense “shares . . . a common question of law or fact” with
the main case—an extremely thin connection. Rule 24(b)(3) directs the court to
consider undue delay or prejudice to the original parties but does not identify the
interests of the prospective intervener to balance against those concerns.
Rule 19’s treatment of mandatory joinder offers considerably more insight.121
It even more directly overrides the rules’ usual deference to the plaintiff on joinder questions.122 It seeks to balance three interests, which have analogues in public policy debates: the interests of the present parties, the interests of those currently excluded from the process, and the public interest in a decision-making
process that does not become hopelessly bogged down.123 This last interest may
take on a quite different cast in civil litigation, where the system’s rewards and
penalties are skewed heavily to favor the broadest possible agglomerations.124
Public policy debates have no such bias in favor of large, complex arrays of
issues; to the contrary, the primary means of advocacy – media accounts of a few
hundred words at most – do not lend themselves to sorting out multiple, partially
overlapping claims. This difference may reflect different points of departure:
the common law forms of action gave limits on joinder in civil litigation a bad
odor125 while joining too many sets of claims to a single public policy debate
120
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multiplied the risk of consistent ideological cleavage, widely viewed as inconsistent with the American political system.
The present Rule 19 is the successor to the concepts of necessary and indispensable parties, in whose absence the litigation might reach a result against
“equity and good conscience.”126 Scholars criticized that formulation for relying
on subjective assessments of the desirability of the litigation’s result;127 the
resulting reformulation offers a clearer analogue to the policy realm by focusing
on the unfairness of excluding parties from debates that vitally concern them.
The present Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) forces the original parties to accept the
joinder of any person who “claims an interest relating to the subject of the action” if excluding that person’s claims or defenses would, “as a practical matter
impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest”. The “impair or impede” standard falls well short of necessity; it only requires tangible prejudice.
Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) also requires joinder of interested parties if their exclusion
creates a “substantial risk” of subjecting one of the existing parties to “inconsistent obligations”. This is the other side of the coin: just as parties have a right to
joinder if they might be unable to obtain separate consideration of their claims,
they also must be joined if they could obtain a later hearing but might unsettle the
result of the present litigation in the process. Where a party whose joinder is
mandatory cannot be joined for whatever reason, Rule 19(b) requires the court to
consider dismissing an otherwise proper action. It requires the court to consider
prejudice to the absent party, the ability to narrow the resolution of the litigation
to reduce that prejudice (and whether doing so would prevent the meaningful
resolution of the litigation), and whether the original plaintiff “would have an
adequate remedy if the action were dismissed”. This is a familiar balancing of
the equities, but one of a special kind: the focus is on the various parties’ ability
to obtain relief rather than on the burdens of proving their entitlement to that
relief. The rule’s list is not exclusive, but its list strongly implies that the
substantive prejudice of not being able to obtain relief overrides any procedural
burdens that joinder or non-joinder might entail.
Once joined, a party may assert any claims it has against other parties,
regardless of their relevance to, or impact on the resolution of, the underlying
litigation.128 This honors the principle that parties may not be drawn into
litigation to serve the interests of others without being given the chance to
vindicate their own interests.
5. Evaluating the Harm Joinder Can Cause in the Policy Arena
Opponents of policy issue joinder commonly assert that circumstances “simply will not allow consideration” of other factors. This claim could mean any of
several quite distinct things. First, the need for exclusivity may reflect limits of
administrative capacity. The military often invokes this ground when it insists on
a clear set of operational objectives. Destroying an opponent’s weapons or tak126
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ing contested ground may be feasible; doing so while avoiding this or that common side effect of the use of force is far more difficult. This objection is most
likely to have weight where individuals must make nearly instantaneous decisions or where the proposed amendment would add responsibilities to an agency
that lacks the practical ability to expand accordingly. It has no force against proposals that some other entity would carry out.
Second, the argument to exclude other factors may imply limitations of longterm deliberative capacity. Adding more factors to policy deliberations may
prevent achievement of a consensus. The likelihood of an impasse rises
significantly as the number of alternatives under consideration increases.129
Indeed, floating alternatives to confuse and divide the coalition behind the
dominant proposal is a major method by which a sophisticated opponent may
organize opposition.130 Objective standards for identifying poison pills, however,
are elusive: even die-hard members of a coalition may differ as to whether an
amendment improves or politically debilitates their initiative. And absent such
standards, this principle justifies keeping down the total number of amendments
but offers little guidance on which leaders ought to be compelled to accept.
Third, leaders may exclude a valid policy claim because of limited short-term
deliberative capacity. Expanding the set of constraints under which policy is to
be formed may sufficiently complexify deliberations to prevent the achievement
of a consensus in a timely manner. Here again, the gravamen is to reduce the
number of complicating amendments, with little guidance as to which ones.
Fourth, leaders may exclude a valid claim if it is insufficiently distinguishable
from other claims and the cumulative effect of considering the like claims would
be to overtax the system’s legal, long-term deliberative, or short-term
deliberative capacity. This is the time-honored principle on which a teacher
refuses to give cookies to any children because he or she does not have enough
for all: each child’s claim for a cookie is reasonable enough, but the teacher
cannot them all. This concept militates in favor of a “clean bill”; once leaders
accept some claims to inclusion, they have difficulty excluding others. It applies,
however, only if the many claims presented are largely indistinguishable. If one
child is about to faint from low blood sugar, the teacher can and should give that
child a cookie without worrying about the rest of the class. Thus, even if leaders
exclude all claims proffered in search of salience, they nonetheless could
consistently admit claims that seek to mitigate externalities from their initiatives.
Fifth, leaders occasionally exclude a valid claim if they cannot advance it
without hindering vindication of another, more important claim. This is
particularly likely if they can achieve the same relief that the excluded claim
sought by succeeding on the priority claim. Thus, counsel in class action
litigation typically designate as class representatives plaintiffs whose claims are
especially compelling, denying individual attention to class members whose
claims would be less likely to win on their own. And although some segregated
129
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schools were dramatically worse than others, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
declined to try to enforce the “separate but equal” doctrine, tying the fate of
students in the worst segregated schools to that of all other victims of segregated
education. This idea has little applicability to amendments that benefit a
different class from that whom the base initiative would serve.
Finally, and most problematically, leaders occasionally reject a valid claim if
they believe it would be too divisive. They declare that “we are all in this
together” and resist any assertions to the contrary. Rather paradoxically, they
privilege the value of social solidarity over the interests of those making the
rejected claim. Not surprisingly, such expressions of indifference for others’
well-being, coming just as we ask them to commit to ours, often fail. To keep
these appeals to community spirit from exhausting their credibility, leaders
should endeavor to invoke it as little as possible, to avoid repeated invocations
against the same interests, and to provide relief in another form to mitigate the
harm from being denied joinder.
6. Principles for Allowing Joinder of Policy Claims
The foregoing discussion suggests four principles for overriding a sponsor’s
preferences to exclude an issue from consideration with her or his initiative.
These identify the most compelling types of appeals for joinder; many of these
also are among those whose joinder would do the least damage to underlying
initiatives. The wider political community—those broadly open to both
proposals on the merits but not specifically aligned with either—will need to
weigh these arguments for joinder against the costs it could impose, as outlined
above. Inevitably, these judgments cannot be entirely independent of substance.
For example, if joining an additional issue seems to threaten to bring down the
base initiative with decisional overload (the second, third, and fourth concerns in
the preceding subsection), cabining debates on regulatory matters is much easier
than containing those on fiscal affairs.131
a. Reciprocity or Estoppel
Initiatives’ sponsors positions rarely will be symmetrical with those of people
seeking admission to the debate. A narrow, mechanical application of norms of
reciprocity therefore will provide little guidance. Nonetheless, asking them to do
equity as they seek equity can resolve several kinds of joinder problems. If an
initiative’s sponsors have invoked a group’s interests to advance their cause, they
may seem hypocritical to turn that group away when it seeks to protect its
interests. Similarly, when those sponsors have tied their cause rhetorically to the
one seeking joinder, they may be estopped from objecting to making that
conjunction permanent. The base initiative’s sponsors’ appeals to a political or
geographic community to unite to solve a significant problem also may estop
them from rejecting the urgent needs of that community’s other members. More
broadly, when joinder would bring some benefit to the base initiative, even if it
also brings some risks or complications, joinder seems far less parasitic.
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b. Necessity
The strength of would-be interveners’ need for their issue’s inclusion in the
present policy debate obviously should weigh in any calculations. As in
determinations under Rule 19 of which parties’ presence is required for litigation
to proceed, however, the original initiative’s sponsors need only consider
procedural necessity. Assertions of substantive necessity—arguments that the
proposed amendment is vital public policy—depend on personal norms and
priorities about which no consensus is likely. Thus making substantive necessity
the determinant of which issues a policy debate includes effectively leaves
joinder questions for resolution based on raw political power.
On the other hand, the likelihood that a related set of concerns cannot
otherwise ever receive a decision on the merits is a powerful argument for
joinder. This inability could result either because the base initiative’s enactment
creates irremediable obstacles132 or because the proffered amendment could
never gain salience on its own.133 In the latter case, other political actors can
assess whether this is the case through an examination of past efforts to press
similar concerns. In assessing past failures, they must seek to distinguish
between proposals considered and rejected on the merits, on the one hand, and
those that never drew substantive consideration, on the other: a procedural
necessity doctrine need not be concerned with each excluded proposal’s success
but rather with its consideration on the merits. If claims like those seeking
admission to a debate never gain the political process’s attention on their own but
do not face particularly strong opposition on the merits, they have a good case for
joinder.134
c. Defensive Claims
A particularly strong claim for admitting a new concern to a debate arises
where the base initiative is not only germane to the proffered amendment but
causes affirmative harm to the interests that amendment champions. For the
most part, this means that amendments seeking to contain the base initiative’s
externalities would receive preference over those seeking salience. Some of the
latter, however, are in fact responses to political externalities: although the base
initiative does no harm to the substantive interests the proposed intervention
seeks to advance, it would prevent the would-be interveners from gaining a
decision on the merits. This could be because the political process is unlikely to
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give salience to two similar proposals in succession135 or because the deals that
must be struck to pass the first will leave insufficient political capital to prevail.
Whatever the nature of the harm the base initiative would do to the interests
the proffered amendment seeks to protect, ameliorating that harm may be seen as
a special case of necessity. Norms of reciprocity also may support inclusion of
defensive amendments. Myopic champions of a cause facing a setback might be
tempted to oppose the base initiative; the fact that they do not, whether because
of community spirit or self-interested political calculations, confers a benefit on
the base initiative that has some claim to reciprocation. Such amicable displays
of deference also advance the broader political community’s interest in avoiding
contention. Community-regarding norms are more likely to take root if those
following them often reap rewards.
d. Spreading Political Losses
If the same group continuously finds consideration of its interests
subordinated to the greater good, its claims for inclusion become stronger.
Inefficiencies in the political process, and often systematic undervaluation of
some kinds of interests, are inevitable. The concentration of the resulting losses
on one group often is not. A group previously asked to subordinate its interests
to the greater good has a better argument for joinder than one that generally has
received decisions on the merits of its proposals. Compelling the base initiative’s
sponsors to endure some losses—greater complexity and an increased risk that
their effort will fail—seems fairer than again wiping out the outside group’s
concerns. Rule 19 embodies this notion of shared burden by asking the trial
judge to consider ways of narrowing the relief to the parties present in litigation
as an alternative both to dismissing the litigation—fully protecting the absent
party—or granting all the relief the active parties seek.
B. Reasons to Admit Distributional Justice to Climate Change Debates
Attempting to determine whether climate change legislation should offset the
effects on low-income people of increased carbon costs by identifying which
claims are logically or morally superior will be unavailing. For example, some
argue that ecological claims are ethically superior to political, social or economic
ones because society’s continuation depends on avoiding ecological calamity.136
Others would leave the question for open political conflict, arguing that liberal
democracy is a necessary precondition to ecological or distributional claims
gaining any traction.137 Still others might argue that severe poverty is
inconsistent with the creation of durable ecological policies or a stable liberal
democracy because desperate people necessarily have short time horizons and are
135
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vulnerable to cooptation by illiberal or rapacious forces.138 No consensus is
likely that any one of these assertions is superior to the others.
The principles developed in section A, however, strongly support including
anti-poverty concerns in climate change debates. First and foremost, claims for
low-income offsets are defensive in nature, unlike most other claims seeking
inclusion in climate change legislation. Those other claims, ranging from
compelling proposals to fund basic science research and habitat adaptation to
appeals for infrastructure reconstruction, seek to enhance the response to the
underlying problem of climate change, not mitigate harm that rising carbon
prices would cause.139 The other three principles dictate the same result. As
subsection 1 shows, the environmental movement has relied heavily on similar
moral principles to those at the heart of arguments for distributional justice, and
climate change legislation would benefit substantially from low-income offsets in
both the near- and long-term. Subsection 2 makes the case for necessity,
showing that if climate change legislation excludes distributional justice
concerns, those concerns are unlikely to win a hearing through other means.
Finally, subsection 3 notes that climate change legislation cannot prevent some
adverse effects on low-income people, strengthening the case for addressing
those that are within reach.
1. Reciprocity and Estoppel
Ideals of distributive justice have much to offer the environmental movement
in general and the campaign to check climate change in particular. Their
philosophical roots are similar to those of important strains of environmental
ethics. Addressing distributive justice effectively would enhance the political
legitimacy of the effort to check climate change, which is vital to its success.
Vast wealth inequalities promote environmental waste by the affluent and
impoverished alike while complicating regulators’ tasks. Thus, the stakes go
beyond distributive justice. Some redistributions also improve allocative
efficiency.140 As explained in Part IV infra, a properly designed system of lowincome offsets would do just that. Finally, the environmental community’s
reliance on environmental justice arguments estops it from denying distributive
justice’s centrality to environmental concerns such as climate change.
To be sure, the reverse is also emphatically true: action on climate change is
very important to low-income people. They disproportionately bear the burden
of environmental degradation in general.141 More specifically, poverty both
reduces the ability to adapt to climate change and increases vulnerability to its
effects.142
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a. Shared Political and Ethical Foundations
The environmental movement’s early ancestors showed remarkable
insensitivity to racial oppression,143 even when environmental interests and those
of racial minorities were closely intertwined.144 The modern environmental
movement, however, built itself on the foundations of movements for racial and
economic justice in the 1960s and 1970s.145
Environmentalism and distributive justice also share important normative
premises.146 Both place great ethical weight on Locke’s assumption that the right
to acquire property is limited by the ethical need to leave enough for others.147
Each seeks to correct Locke’s assumptions of abundance to reflect life in modern
economies, one with respect to natural resources and the other with respect to
individual opportunity.148 Both seek to reform the early liberal suspicion of
government to put it to work in creating the conditions of individual freedom.149
Not surprisingly, then, a number of environmental theorists make arguments
about distributive justice. Many of them focus on harms done to future
generations150 or to other species,151 but some seek to identify ecological
preservation as either a form of justice in itself or as a necessary precondition to
the functioning of a society capable of doing justice in all other respects.152 Just
as John Rawls suggested that, in the original position, each individual should
prefer whatever allocation of wealth does best by the least well-off (accepting
only those differences in wealth that are advantageous for all, including the
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poor),153 some of these environmental ethicists effectively argue for selecting
policies from a still more basic original position in which none of us knows what
species we will be.
b. Distributive Justice and Political Legitimacy
Environmental interests and those of low-income people tend to be
underrepresented in political debates for similar reasons.154 For both, the harms
they seek to avert fall largely outside the view of mainstream middle-class
society and its media outlets. Both groups depend on the uncertain, and largely
episodic, support of altruists, many of whom have other commitments.155 Both
therefore share a strong need for political legitimacy: without it, some of their
supporters that also believe in “good government” might defect while others
might engage sufficiently for the cause to achieve salience.
Improving social equity can strengthen society and better equip it to handle
the stresses of profound changes of the kind involved in climate change regulation.156 Regulation addressing climate change will work one of the most profound transformations on society of any public act in recent times. A deliberative
process in which environmental groups seek consensus among themselves is
likely to “further marginalization of disadvantaged groups and perspectives.”157
If that regulation is crafted without reflecting the interests of large numbers of
low-income people, political legitimacy is likely to be lacking.158
Pragmatically, a comprehensive response to climate change is impossible
without addressing distributive justice concerns. Effective action against climate
change requires international cooperation, and no international agreement that
obstructs poorer nations’ economic development will win their assent. Indeed,
Article 4.7 of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change recognizes that economic and social development, and eradicating poverty, are developing countries’ primary priorities.159 Long-term sales of carbon
credits arranged by contemporary elites in developing countries may prove
unsustainable when those elites lose power if the terms are perceived as locking
the country into poverty.160 On the other hand, allowing those nations to increase
their per capita emissions to the current levels of affluent countries would doom
efforts to restrain climate change. The political legitimacy that careful attention
to distributional justice brings is therefore crucial.
Domestically, environmentalists depend on a broader appreciation of
distributional justice’s importance. Although “greater efficiency can go some
way toward the goals of saving the environment, and slowing resource depletion,
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. . . all but the genuinely poor in the North will be required to consumer less
resources.”161 Any successful international regime, whether based on the Kyoto
Protocol or not, therefore will have to require emissions reductions in affluent
countries while allowing some, presumably moderated, growth in emissions in
poor countries. That system will face the same nationalistic attacks that the
Kyoto Protocol has. Apart from the realpolitik of international relations—which
is both normatively unappealing and all but impossible to convey to the lay
public—distributive concerns are the main justification for such arrangements.
Accordingly, environmentalists need to find their collective voice on issues of
distributive justice.
c. The Environmental Benefits of Reducing Wealth Inequality
Strategically, even narrowly focused environmentalists should care about the
distributional impact of climate change and resulting regulatory regimes. Huge
wealth disparities overall are not good for the environment. With highly
concentrated wealth typically goes highly concentrated political power, which is
likely to be wielded selfishly to defend lucrative practices despite harm to the
environment.162 At the other end of the distribution, dire necessity motivates
many environmentally destructive practices, from slash-and-burn agriculture to
over-lumbering and poaching endangered species. When someone’s family’s
survival is at stake, only the most repressive—and costly—enforcement regimes
will have any chance of achieving compliance with environmental rules. Elites’
environmental initiatives that threatened low-income people’s well-being have
been perceived as oppressive and spawned sharp resistance.163 Put in more
affirmative terms, low-income people are likely to have among the highest
marginal expected rate of return from additional expenditures, such as those on
education or safer housing; the pursuit of these returns will motivate them to
subordinate compliance with environmental regimes.164
A single regime of incentives will have difficulty working across a broad
income distribution: additional costs that the affluent shrug off may devastate
impoverished families. This raises both political and humanitarian obstacles to
effectively deterring the affluent’s environmentally destructive conduct.
Offsetting much of their impact on low-income people therefore allows
calibration of incentives to change the behavior of affluent people, who typically
consume far more.
Moreover, low-income people may lack the resources to make environmentally desirable investments even when policy succeeds in making those
investments financially advantageous. A family might save considerable money
over the next decade by insulating its house, buying a new, greener heating
system, or a more energy-efficient car is simply not an option if it lacks the funds
to make those investments and is too poor to have access to affordable credit.
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d. Institutional Estoppel: The Environmental Justice Movement
Over the past couple of decades, the environmental movement has received
significant support from low-income people’s allies through the environmental
justice movement. This group has natural interests in the distributional aspects of
carbon emissions regulation. While the mainstream environmentalists seek to
reduce aggregate pollution,165 the environmental justice movement’s focus is
distributional: the disproportionate concentration of polluters in low-income
communities and, even more, communities of color.166 It has attacked both siting
procedures that exclude vulnerable communities’ voices and the disparate
impacts flowing from those procedures.167 In doing so, it has brought democratic
values and the terms of the social contract to the fore in environmental
discourse.168 Although the environmental justice movement’s place within the
broader environmental community is by no means uncontroversial, most of that
community has welcomed this alliance.
Having accepted distributional
arguments that strengthen their agenda, a group could seem hypocritical
objecting to these concerns’ inclusion in climate change debates.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has defined environmental
justice as preventing disproportionate effects of negative exposures.169 Higher
prices are a necessary but negative consequence of carbon emissions regulation,
and they will consume a disproportionate share of low-income people’s
resources. That negative exposure thus would seem to make this an issue of
environmental justice. To date, however, the environmental justice movement
has remained largely silent. Instead, it has continued to focus on geographically
distinct communities rather than on people of color and low-income people generally. Cap-and-trade systems’ focus on aggregate emissions arouse deep submissions among environmental justice advocates, who have seen past aggregate
limits met by reducing pollution in affluent, white areas.170 More generally, they
have become convinced that market-based regulation systematically disadvantages vulnerable communities171 and advocate a command-and-control model.172
Many environmental justice groups therefore have opposed the basic regulatory
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concept,173 leaving them ill-positioned to influence the design of particular
legislation.
Yet while the environmental justice movement is not engaged, its critics may
react similarly to proposals to offset the regressive effects of higher carbon costs.
Some traditional environmentalists have rejected the environmental justice
agenda as a special interest displacing core environmental concerns;174 they could
argue that addressing the distributional and fiscal consequences of carbon
regulation could slow progress toward the goal of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions either politically, by complicating the enactment of legislation, or
practically, by attenuating incentives to conserve. Legislation often depends on
“unholy alliances” between environmentalists and industry;175 bringing more
interests to the table threatens to disrupt those deals. The sweep of the concerns
the environmental justice movement has espoused—including opposition to
military occupation and oppression and broad support for political, economic and
cultural self-determination176—has increased traditional environmentalists’
concern that it would draw them far afield from their core concerns and embroil
them in most contemporary political debates. These fears are likely to work
against admitting the consequences for low-income people and the federal fisc
into climate change debates.
On the other hand, some critiques of environmental justice have little
applicability to low-income offsets in climate change legislation. Both the direct
costs of the consultative processes and uncertainty about their outcomes make
industry more resistant to regulation,177 possibly necessitating concessions on the
substantive level of emissions reductions.178 Directing the proceeds of carbon
regulation to low-income offsets and deficit reduction would not affect the
underlying regulatory structure or, as a result, industry’s costs. Others see
bureaucratic review processes as dampening citizen activism;179 an efficient
system of low-income offsets need not provide such distraction. Debates about
whether to emphasize ex ante chances or ex post results180 also are irrelevant to
these economic subsidies.
2. Necessity of Legislative Response
Carbon cost increases’ impacts on low-income people are far too great to be
resolved without legislation. Aid to low-income people in general requires
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legislation181 because the satisfaction of helping the less fortunate is a public
good that cannot effectively be confined to those that pay.182 And just as collective action problems doom significant private redistributions of money, so too
they hamper redistributions of the political capital needed to win salience for
anti-poverty legislation.183
The proceeds from regulating carbon emissions could all too easily dissipate
in the manner of past programmatic windfalls obtained without simultaneous
requirements to redistribute the proceeds. The tobacco companies’ vast settlement of their liability to Medicaid for tobacco-caused illnesses touched off budgetary feeding frenzies at both the federal and state levels. At both levels, both
executive officials and legislators struggled to find principles for adjudicating the
numerous proposals with clear, dubious, and no relationship to health. In the
end, Congress ducked the issue, ceding its share of the settlement to the states
despite the fact that it had paid three-fifths of the costs giving rise to the
settlement (as well as half of states’ litigation costs). State allocations of tobacco
settlement funds ranged from the visionary to the embarrassing.
Similarly, states realized large savings from the deinstitutionalization of the
mentally ill and people with developmental disabilities. Assisted living in the
community, habilitation, and outpatient mental health services would have cost
only a modest fraction of the savings and could have made deinstitutionalization
an unqualified success. Instead, the savings from the closed facilities disappeared into states’ general funds, divided among myriad spending and tax initiatives with stronger political support. Community-based services lacked capacity
to handle the influx of deinstitutionalized people, and many ended up living on
the streets.184
3. Frequent Disregard of Low-Income People’s Interests
Heedless policymaking disproportionately disadvantages low-income people
and people of color. All too often, they lack the political power to block policies
that disregard their interests. Little policymaking is heedless of the interests of
the affluent. Moreover, because most policymaking begins from the baseline of
current policy—current law, last year’s funding level, the results of past political
battles—the historical disadvantages in policymaking that low-income people
and people of color have experienced means that they are much less likely to be
181
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protected in the baseline. They thus have less to offer in trade for any new
accommodations they seek. They also enjoy no counter-majoritarian protection
from the Takings Clause, but their interests may be subject to countermajoritarian threat from tax limitation rules at the state and local level and from
federal budget process rules that disfavor progressive fiscal policies.
The process of negotiating climate change policy could easily follow, and
compound, this pattern. Such regulation is, in a broad sense, a public good.185
Although providing of a new public good financed in a distributionally neutral
manner does not affect the need for redistribution if the public good is a perfect
substitute for private consumption,186 moderating climate change is unlikely to be
such a substitute.
Moreover, increasing the cost of energy is likely to adversely affect many
low-income people in powerful but indirect ways for which no ready response is
possible. Over the past six decades, the affluent have moved to suburbia,
abandoning central cities to low-income people. As the costs of commuting
increase, many wealthier workers are likely to find homes closer to the city
center more attractive, bidding up housing costs and driving low-income people
out of neighborhoods where they have lived much of their lives. Shortening
commutes and increasing population density are important enough means of
reducing carbon emissions that government policy will not intervene on lowincome communities’ behalf. Even identifying which particular low-income
people suffered from this sudden gentrification would be difficult, meaning that
these and other indirect losses are likely to receive no offset. This makes all the
more urgent the offsetting of direct losses that all low-income people will feel
when energy costs rise.
C. Admitting Fiscal Concerns to the Climate Change Debate
The case for including major deficit reduction in climate change legislation is
more complex. Like aid to low-income people, deficit reduction suffers from
severe collective action problems in the political arena: many people support it
in principle, but few do so with enough fervor to engage in concerted political
action. It therefore has little chance to muscle its way into climate change
legislation politically. The principles developed in section A, however, offer a
compelling ethical case for its inclusion.
A claim for deficit reduction is not defensive in the simplistic sense: no one is
proposing climate change legislation that would add to the federal deficit.187
Climate change legislation could, however, badly undermine deficit reduction
politically. With one of the major political parties defining itself by its
opposition to taxes and the other treating the topic gingerly, two major rounds of
tax increases are unlikely to pass within a few months, or even years, of one
another.188 Enactment of a carbon tax, or a cap-and-trade system perceived to be
185

LOUIS KAPLOW, PUBLIC GOODS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 1 (2003).
Id. at 14-15.
187
Without offsetting transfers, increasing carbon costs could devastate state and local governments.
188
Even if a second round of tax increases was politically feasible, those might well be devoted to
broadening health care coverage rather than deficit reduction.
186

43

the equivalent of a tax, therefore will eliminate one of the two main tools for
deficit reduction. Eliminating a structural deficit of the kind this country had
built even before the financial crisis with spending cuts alone would be difficult
or impossible and in any event would almost certainly be highly regressive.189
Estoppel arguments for deficit reduction, too, will be controversial. Some
environmentalists resist attempts to compare environmental and other values; this
concern becomes especially acute with regard to monetized non-environmental
values.190 On the other hand, the environmental movement’s effectiveness
depends on its ability to reconcile elements with sharply differing worldviews,191
and in important respects many environmentalists share ethical assumptions with
deficit hawks. Both emphasize ethical duties to future generations192 and the risk
of bequeathing them problems much easier solved in our time. Both groups are
broadly critical of unbridled consumption. Thus, devoting most of the proceeds
of carbon emissions regulation to reducing the deficit reinforces important
themes on which the environmental movement depends; declining to do so could
cause some to question the sincerity of the movement’s commitment to future
generations.
Including significant deficit reduction in the legislation also would bring
political benefits, helping to win support among conservative Democrats with
weak environmental credentials but strong concern for fiscal probity. This
support may well not compare with what the legislation could garner spreading
its proceeds around to myriad interest groups. It would be enough, however, for
deficit hawks to claim legitimately that they are bringing something to the table.
Deficit reduction cannot be had without legislation. And as noted above, the
lack of a large, committed constituency for deficit reduction contributes to the
legislative process’s chronic passivity even as politicians and the media give
deficits great rhetorical salience. In deficit reduction packages, the appeal of the
whole far exceeds that of the sum of its parts. The long odds of passing
legislation, coupled with the political costs of proposing specific spending cuts or
tax increases, even absent enactment, keeps most legislators from offering
specific deficit reduction proposals. Thus, gaining a decision on the merits of
deficit reduction outside of the climate change legislation, while possible,
remains quite unlikely.
Finally, deficit reduction has repeatedly been subordinated to other interests,
including environmental ones. President Bush repeatedly won for tax cuts that
he argued would stimulate the economy, eliminating a substantial budget surplus
and creating large deficits. He and Congress approved dramatic increases in
spending for homeland security and wars overseas; arguments about the
importance of environmental programs played a significant part in blocking offsetting domestic spending reductions. Most recently, congressional leaders won
House passage of the $700 billion bail-out bill for the financial industry by
189

To the extent this was the result, this analysis converges with that in section B, supra.
SMITH, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 154, at 37-40.
191
Id. at 21-24.
192
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
190

44

incorporating over one hundred billion dollars of popular tax cuts in the package.
Among these were environmental measures such as tax credits for developing
alternative fuels. Postponing deficit reduction again in passing carbon emissions
legislation would only confirm its status as a political punching bag.
IV. Accommodating Environmental, Distributional and Fiscal Concerns
Even if distributional and fiscal concerns are admitted to the climate change
debate, their success is far from assured. Both compete with numerous other
claims for the available funds, many of which also have legitimate claims to
consideration under these same criteria. Because of this country’s massive longterm fiscal imbalance, if deficit reduction cannot defeat most other claims for the
proceeds of a carbon regulatory regime, a fiscally responsible climate change
policy is impossible. Low-income subsidies are comparatively affordable but are
conceptually, administratively and politically more complex. A subsidy system
must reach all, or at least the vast majority of, people most at risk and must do so
without undermining the larger legislation’s incentives for carbon emissions
reduction, without creating a new bureaucracy that could become a lightening rod
for criticism, and without reopening any of the emotional political battles that
have surrounded anti-poverty policy.
This Part asserts that a fiscally responsible and distributionally sensitive
climate change policy can meet those demands. Section A shows how many of
the supposedly targeted subsidies competing for the money climate change
legislation will make available are in fact inefficient to the point of futility.
Section B shows that the low-income subsidies in major proposals also are
woefully inefficient. Moreover, existing anti-poverty programs’ design is too
brittle to be able to assimilate these new subsidy funds effectively. Nonetheless,
it shows how those programs can be reorganized and consolidated to provide an
effective and well-targeted response to the burdens climate change regulation
will impose on low-income people.
A. Fiscally Responsible Climate Change Policy
A carbon tax makes as much sense fiscally as it does environmentally. The
federal budget faces severe structural imbalances. Six years into the recent
economic expansion—at a point in the business cycle when the federal
government ought to be accumulating large surpluses to pay down the national
debt, it was still running large deficits. As the economic slowdown reduces
revenues and increases claims for unemployment compensation and for needbased benefits such as food stamps and Medicaid, these deficits have started to
spiral. These structural deficits result primarily from the huge tax cuts enacted in
2001 and 2003 and the debt they engendered. Even more ominously, the
confluence of demographic changes and exploding health care costs are projected
to overwhelm the federal budget once the baby boomers begin retiring in large
numbers beginning less than five years from now.
Whether Congress addresses these deficits through tax increases, spending
cuts, or a combination of the two, the effect will be deflationary. Put another
way, the federal government’s current hyper-stimulation of the economy is
unsustainable. If increasing the drag on the economy is inevitable, doing so in a
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way that steers us toward lower carbon emissions is logical. Conversely,
manipulating climate change policy to avoid macroeconomic effects only to
recreate those same effects a few years later would accomplish little.
A carbon tax with much of its revenues dedicated to deficit reduction and debt
retirement therefore would be well-timed. A cap-and-trade system can be
designed to achieve similar effects. If the federal government auctions off, rather
than giving away, emissions permits, the resulting revenues should be equivalent
to those under a carbon tax achieving a comparable level of CO2 reductions. In
each system, the market will reach equilibrium when prices rise to a level that
limits aggregate demand to the specified, reduced levels. Under a carbon tax, the
government will increase those prices directly with its tax.
A significant part of a fiscally responsible climate change policy is fending
off the countless suitors for funds raised. The deficiencies of claims to subsidize
existing emitters, under the guise of compensation, are discussed above. Another
major claim on these resources is for funding a wide variety of state, local, and
private sector activities related to climate change. Some involve research and
development into cleaner energy technologies, techniques for sequestering
carbon, or methods for helping humans or wildlife adapt to climate change that is
not now preventable. Others involve operating subsidies for state, local, and
private sector efforts at mitigation of or adaptation to climate change. These
claims’ cumulative effect seems more than capable of consuming all resources
raised. These claims reportedly are being adjudicated and granted at a rapid pace
in private negotiations among environmental advocacy groups, industry, state
and local governments, and others seeking to influence climate change
legislation. Beyond the aesthetic defects of this interest-group feeding frenzy,
serious procedural and substantive concerns counsel against granting many of
these claims, particularly in this forum.
Procedurally, the present spending negotiations are taking place among too
constrained a universe of interests. The burdens of climate change regulation
will not be limited to ecological interests; decisions about how to manage its
fiscal and economic consequences similarly should not be so limited. Issues this
fundamental are proper subjects of society-wide dialogue.193 Climate change
regulation itself will be, but these spending decisions are being addressed very
much in the fine print of this legislation.
An important feature coming out of these on-going negotiations, reflected in
the House bill and the 2008 Senate bill, appears to be the creation of dedicated
funds devoted to one or another environmental purpose. Alas, dedicated funds
tend to skew public priority-setting. They foster the artificial sense that spending
up to the amount in the fund is costless. This hinders comparisons between the
value of projects eligible for the special fund and either other public uses for the
funds or simply leaving the funds in the private sector. The reduced political
competition can engender sloppy inefficient public management, even where a
193
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well-designed project would have been warranted. Rarely is the amount of
money raised by the segregated revenue stream a good proxy for the sums
needed for the designated activities. In practice, these funding arrangements can
operate as floors; they ensure that spending will at least equal receipts from the
specified source but impose little political barrier to the pursuit of more from the
general fund. Attempts to divert funds for other priorities are denounced as
“raids,” almost as if they were takings of private property.194 Some state
governments in particular have found their ability to meet public needs without
taxing at egregious levels hampered by permanent earmarks within their budgets,
often enacted by voter initiatives. Dubious spending from the highway trust
fund, and public confusion about the meaning of the Social Security and
Medicare trust funds, show that the federal system is not immune from these
problems.
A general substantive concern about many claims for the proceeds of a carbon
tax or permit sale is that the claims’ justification assumes an unrealistically static
baseline. Proposals for the federal government to fund an activity naturally and
appropriately give rise to the question of why the private sector or other levels of
government are not doing so. Absent obvious cases of impossibility (e.g.,
funding national defense or foreign policy), the most common answer is that, for
whatever reason, no one else is in fact providing the needed funding. This is a
reasonably persuasive response in most static policy environments. Here,
however, the policy environment is emphatically not stable. That is both the
essence of climate change and the purpose of legislation to restrict greenhouse
gas emissions. For example, although emissions reduction clearly would benefit
from more research on alternative energy sources than is now being funded,
emissions regulation will make that research far more remunerative.195
Similarly, although some may argue that state and local governments could
usefully increase their planning for climate change mitigation and adaptation,
their failure to do so to date likely reflects the salience of climate change as a
public concern. State and local governments focus their efforts on activities important to their electorates; as climate change proceeds and emissions restrictions
intensify their impact, these issues will command more public concern and will
consume greater shares of state and local planning budgets, perhaps at the
expense of road-building or opulent holiday lighting. None of the three major
justifications for federal subsidization of state and local governments apply
broadly here. For the most part, state and local governments as a group have a
weak case for fiscal compensation as they are not losing a major source of
support and the burdens of climate change and emissions regulations do not fall
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so disproportionately on them.196 The federal government enjoys no particular
comparative advantage in funding these activities relative to state and local
governments (beyond its possession of a generally more efficient revenue
structure).197 And no special need for federal leadership in the design of state and
local programs is evident; if anything, many states and localities have been well
ahead of the federal government in responding to climate change.198
This is not to say that all proposals for spending on climate change mitigation
and adaptation are premature. Some market failures are predictable even in a
world addressing climate change far more forcefully than ours. For example,
private businesses have great difficulty capturing the beneficial effects of basic
scientific research that could lead to breakthroughs in conservation or clean
energy. Similarly, improving science education at all levels will facilitate
mitigation and adaptation in the future generations, but its benefits will not
accrue particularly to the states or localities that provide it. These cases seem
more the exception than the rule.
An additional substantive concern with many of these proposals is that they
would have the federal government support activities already underway or likely
at the state or local government levels or in the private sector. Shared financing
schemes, although having considerable aesthetic and even ethical appeal, tend to
be extremely inefficient in practice. When a new donor contributes to an existing
activity, existing donors will tend to withdraw some of their funds. This is true
as between committees in Congress, between the various levels of government,
and between the public and private sectors. Thus, devoting proceeds from carbon
regulation to many research activities is likely to crowd out other funding sources, wasting most of the new federal funds and yielding only a small expansion
of the desired activities.
At least once initial start-up costs have been covered, the benefit derived from
each increment of funding in most public activities declines as funding increase.
In a research program, for example, the first dollars go to the most promising
investigations; additional funding allows a second, tier of somewhat less valuable
projects, to proceed, and so on. Each donor contributes to a worthwhile activity
until the marginal value it places on the next increment of that activity ceases to
exceed the marginal value it places on competing uses for those funds.
Table 2: Donors’ Valuation
of Activities of Jointly-Funded
Program (Ordinal Consensus)
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When multiple donors contribute to the same Project Value to Value to
Original Second
project, each will have a different set of competing
Donor
Donor
uses for the funds. Even as between two seemingly
A
25
30
identical donors—two cities of equal size and wealth
B
20
24
confronting a shared, regional problem or two
C
15
18
D
10
12
wealthy individuals arranging their charitable donaE
5
6
tions—they are likely to value those choices differ199
ently.
Therefore, each will have place a different value on what could be
accomplished by an additional contribution to their shared project and each will
have a different threshold that such contributions must be able to meet in order to
out-compete other uses for the funds. When a new donor begins to contribute to
a project, its funds support activities that existing donors had deemed
insufficiently valuable to support. If the original donor then reduces its
contributions, it can divert those funds to other activities that it values more
highly than the newly-funded activity of the shared program. The original donor
may reduce its contributions by the entire amount that the new donor provided or
may allow the shared program to experience some increase in income, either to
induce continued support from its funding partner or because it has a limited
number of appealing competing priorities for the money that it could withdraw.
Consider a simple example in which two donors are weighing five projects,
each of which costs the same. Table 2 suggests how the respective donors might
value the projects’ likely results. Suppose the original donor funded activities A,
B, and C.200 The original donor does not fund project D—valued at 10—because
it has another, unrelated activity it can support with the same funds that is worth
13 to it. When the second donor appears, with its different valuations of the possible projects, its only question is whether to fund projects D and E—the other
three already are underway. If it has no options worth more to it than 12, it will
find it advantageous to provide funds sufficient for one additional activity,
namely project D. When the original donor sees this, however, it may consider
cutting its funding by one-third. This will reduce total program funding to the
level sufficient to support three projects, which surely will be A, B, and C. Its
withdrawal of funding will sacrifice project D, but it will enable the original
donor to fund the unrelated project that it values more.
The original donor’s withdrawal of one-third of its funding then poses a
dilemma for the new donor. Project D is, again, unfunded. The new donor may
still be spending money elsewhere on activities it values less than 12 and hence
may be inclined to transfer their funding into the joint program to resuscitate project D. Doing so, however, may induce the original donor to withdraw further
funds if that donor still has other, outside activities it prefers to project D. If the
second donor resents this, or measures the cost-effectiveness of its funding
199
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relative to the program’s operations before it became involved, it will withhold
additional funding and may even abandon the program altogether. On the other
hand, it may not understand the dynamics of the original donor’s behavior or it
may use a more recent baseline. If so, this see-saw process of the new donor
increasing its contributions while the prior one withdraws funding will continue
until either one donor has completely exited the program or both donors
thresholds for additional contributions lie between the value to it of the last
funded activity and that of the first unfunded function.
This example assumes that both donors apply the Table 3: Donors’ Valuation
same ordinal ranking to the program’s activities, of Activities of Jointly-Funded
Program (Ordinal Dissensus)
even if they assign different absolute values to those Project Value to Value to
activities. This assumption will hold in many kinds
Original Second
of programs, such as research efforts in which a
Donor
Donor
A
25
30
scientific consensus exists about which it the most
B
20
12
promising toward a common end or a humanitarian
C
15
18
program serving people of varying levels of
D
10
24
deprivation. On the other hand, two donors can
E
5
6
come to a program of common interest with
different priorities. Both, for example, may support expanding access to health
care, but one may think primarily in terms of people with disabilities while
another may emphasize children. Table 3 provides a simple example of this: one
project (perhaps covering children with disabilities) is a consensus top priority,
another (perhaps serving adults without disabilities) is lowest on both donors’
lists, but the two donors rank the three intermediate options quite differently. If
we again assume that the original donor finds it beneficial to fund projects A, B,
and C but not D, the new donor will have a strong incentive to contribute so that
project D, its second priority, can get under way. If the first donor is uninformed
or naïve, it may again seek to withdraw funds, on the assumption that project D
will be the loser. If it does, the program’s managers will face a dilemma.
Dropping project D may or may not fit their personal priorities, but it certainly
seems the best way to induce the second donor to replace the funds the original
donor has withdrawn. On the other hand, doing so may incense the second
donor. If the second donor understands what is going on, it may earmark its
contributions for project D. If the first donor is similarly aware, it may then
earmark its contributions for projects B and C, reasoning that project A will be in
no real jeopardy as the second donor, like it, assigns project A top priority. At
the end of the day, the allocation of funding may be seriously suboptimal from all
participants’ perspectives as one or another player miscalculates the other’s
moves and intentions. The program’s funding also is likely to be heavily
earmarked, leaving its managers little ability to respond to changing needs or
new opportunities.
Negotiation may ameliorate some of these problems. Perhaps the two donors
will agree to split the cost of project A and then each to fund some other
activities in shares reflecting the priority each assigns to it. The incentives for
dissembling in such negotiations, however, are quite strong. In addition, each
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donor may continually be endeavoring to reduce its real contribution
surreptitiously—for example, arranging to contribute over-valued assets in-kind
or to double-count moneys it is giving the program’s operators for other purposes
as its contributions under this agreement. This tendency will create the need for
unusually burdensome accounting and a periodic need for renegotiations to
address new financial gimmicks that one or the other donor has devised.
Moreover, any pact is likely to collapse any time either donor experiences a
substantial increase or decrease in available resources or major changes in
priorities or competing candidates for its funds.
In translating this model into the real world, additional difficulties arise in
arranging negotiations and enforcing the results. When two sets of congressional
committees try to pools their resources to support a common priority, the more
nimble is generally able to leave its partner holding most of the bag. Thus, when
authorizing committees seek to supplement with mandatory funds an activity that
receives a substantial appropriation, the appropriations committees reduce the
program’s discretionary funding.201 Because the appropriations committees act
every year and most mandatory programs are reauthorized or reviewed only at
several-year intervals, they have little immediate fear of a tit-for-tat response by
the authorizers whose contributions they purloined.202 Authorizing committees
that wish to increase funding for an activity receiving discretionary
appropriations may have to convert the entire program, or at least clearly
definable portions of it, to mandatory funding; this is very costly for them and
provides a large windfall to the appropriators unless they can persuade the budget
committees to reduce the appropriators’ allocations correspondingly.203
When the federal government shares fiscal responsibility with other levels of
government, it typically tries to prevent state and local governments from
withdrawing resources to offset federal funding.204 Matching or maintenance-ofeffort requirements are common means to this end. These devices are only
201
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moderately effective and often engender considerable conflict.205 Alternatively,
the federal government can attempt to target its funding to one narrowly defined
component of an activity and leave state and local governments to pay for the rest
of the program.206 The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the precision
with which the federal function can be defined, whether state or local
governments regard the federal function as a substitute for the activities they
fund, and whether accounting systems can be defined that will expose efforts to
cross-subsidize other state and local activities from the one with federal support.
Preventing supplantation when government subsidizes activities that have
received private support is even more difficult, in part because of the greater
number and variety of private actors and in part because accounting restrictions
that are politically acceptable when applied to other levels of government may be
seen as overly intrusive if imposed on the private sector.207 An additional
difficulty with sharing financing with private for-profit entities—and some public
and non-profit ones—is preventing them from expropriating many of the benefits
that motivated the public financing. The federal government would be unlikely
to subsidize an art museum open only to members of an exclusive private club.
Yet it funds a considerable amount of research whose outcomes, and resulting
intellectual property, is closely held by private firms or universities.
B. Protecting Low-Income People from Regressive Cost Increases
Once a decision is made to attempt to offset the impoverishing effects of
carbon emissions controls on low-income people, a host of important
philosophical and design questions remain. Although some may seem quite
technical, they are essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the offset program, to
making that program politically viable over the long-term, and to preventing it
from undermining the goals of climate change regulation itself.
Subsection 1 seeks lessons on program design from the uneven history of
energy assistance efforts over the past several decades. Subsection 2 synthesizes
those lessons and considerations peculiar to climate change regulation into three
principles that should guide any system of low-income offsets. Subsection 3 then
offers such a program, hewing to those principles but departing substantially
from the vague, and likely ineffectual, nods to distributional concerns in climate
change bills to date.
1. Lessons from Prior Efforts to Relieve Energy Costs
Considerable insight can be gained from existing policies for helping lowincome people cope with high energy costs. Although this country has no
coordinated response to this problem, it does have four programs worthy of note.
These programs vary widely as to mission, administration, financing, coverage,
benefits, and incentive structures. Comparing these efforts provides valuable
205

Super, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 131, at 2568-79, 2586-88.
Id. at 2568-71, 2589-91.
207
Although not directly pertinent to the public policy issues discussed in this paper, sharing
financial responsibility among private donors also is often complicated by the sheer numbers of
donors to be coordinated and by the diversity of their preferences, financial capacity and
sophistication.
206

52

insights for the design of a new system for offsetting the regressive effects of
climate change regulation.
First, the energy crisis of the early 1970s prompted Congress to establish the
Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP).208 WAP is a relatively small
program in the U.S. Department of Energy funded with annual discretionary
appropriations. State and local human services agencies administer WAP,
making major decisions about program eligibility and benefits within fixed
federal allocations. Assistance includes installation of storm windows, sealing
gaps around windows and doors, replacing inefficient heaters and air
conditioners, and insulating attics and walls.209 Because of funding constraints,
WAP has served only sixteen percent of the more than twenty-seven million
households eligible for aid.210 Federal administrators have sought contributions
from states and utility companies, with very limited success.211
Second, the energy crisis of the late 1970s spawned the Low-Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP).212 Congress created what became
LIHEAP in 1979 as a temporary stop-gap with the proceeds of the windfall
profits tax it enacted on oil companies.213 Congress subsequently reauthorized
LIHEAP as an ongoing block grant to states funded through annual
appropriations. States have no particular expertise in designing means-tested
programs, as the results in LIHEAP demonstrate. Some provide thin, almost
irrelevant, subsidies to large numbers of people; others offer more substantial aid
but only to a tiny fraction of low-income families.214
Because of this wide state variability, federal appropriators have little idea
which kinds of families are likely to benefit from an increment in funding.
Whether for that reason or because the appropriations process has a notoriously
short memory for commitments made to those without political capital,
LIHEAP’s purchasing power has eroded badly over the years (adjusting for
changes in home energy costs and the number of people living below the poverty
line). Real per-poor-person funding averaged about 90% of the 1980 level
through 1987 but then began to fall precipitously, averaging 60% from 1989 to
1992 before bottoming out at just 37% in 1996.215 Despite the attention high
208
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energy costs have received since the outset of the second Gulf War, LIHEAP’s
appropriations have rebounded to only 45% of their 1980 purchasing power.216
Since 1981, the number of low-income families meeting federal LIHEAP
eligibility standards has risen from nineteen million to more than thirty-five
million while the number actually receiving aid has actually dropped, from seven
million to five million.217 Although the LIHEAP statute seeks to create
incentives for states to contribute to the program, such contributions provide only
a trivial portion of the program’s resources. This may reflect states’ sense that
energy assistance has historically been a federal responsibility or the fact that the
sweeping flexibility they enjoy under LIHEAP’s block grant structure allows
them to address their priorities without spending their own funds.
A third major form of low-income energy assistance in this country comes
from the federal rental housing subsidy programs. These programs, the largest
and most important of which are public housing, project-based Section 8
subsidies, and Section 8 housing vouchers,218 provide relatively deep subsidies to
about five million households, a small minority of eligible low-income families
with children, elderly persons, and persons with disabilities.219 Beginning in the
late 1960s, Congress required these programs to limit tenants’ housing costs to
not more than thirty percent of their incomes. Because HUD had defined
housing costs to include utilities, this made these programs guarantors against
high energy costs to those low-income people fortunate enough to gain subsidies.
As the number of people living in poverty has increased, the purchasing power of
appropriations for assisted housing has decayed. The number of low-income
families HUD determined had severe housing affordability problems increased
33% from 2000 to 2006, yet beginning in 2004, federal deficit pressures led to
8%, or $3.3 billion, in real cuts in the budget for assisted housing, resulting in a
loss of more than 150,000 vouchers.220
In response to the energy crisis of the late 1970s, HUD ordered public
housing authorities (PHAs) to convert as many units as possible to individual
metering. This was intended to give tenants incentives to conserve energy. To
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maintain compliance with the thirty-percent limit on overall housing costs, PHAs
gave each household a “utility allowance” as a credit against its rent. HUD
required the utility allowance to represent the “reasonable” utility costs for units
in a given class. Roughly three in five public housing residents and four in five
housing voucher holders are in the utility allowance system;221 the remainder live
in buildings that have central heating systems or are otherwise not suitable for
individual metering.
These allowances calculations’ have posed persistent problems.222 PHAs
have differed in their definition of “reasonableness,” in how reliably they update
allowances for changes in utility rates, and in which factors they consider when
determining the allowance for a particular unit.223 Even when a PHA endeavors
to set utility allowances properly, doing so requires difficult calculations about
what rates of energy consumption are achievable for various kinds of units. In
theory, they should adjust utility allowances for as many factors as possible other
than individual effort at conservation. Merely accounting for the number of
rooms in a unit and whether it is detached, semi-detached, or bracketed by other
units will ignore several important sources of variability. For example, a
wasteful family in a well-maintained, well-insulated apartment may use far less
energy than a frugal one in a drafty, decrepit unit with the same number of
rooms.224 This seems especially inequitable because PHAs assign tenants to
particular dwelling units and are responsible for the repair and insulation of those
units. Unusually warm winters can vitiate the utility allowance system’s
incentives for conservation; unusually cold weather can leave most tenants’
allowances insufficient.225 Because the housing assistance programs operate
under fixed appropriations, PHAs generally lack the means to supplement
allowances when severe weather strikes.
Seasonal variations can cause serious problems for low-income tenants even
when their PHA established an appropriate utility allowance. To avoid having to
recomputed tenants’ rents every month, PHAs generally provide a flat utility
allowance every month throughout the year.226 This requires tenants to save, and
to continue to conserve energy, during the summer months in order to be able to
afford their winter bills. Low-income people, by definition, face numerous
pressing expenses that make saving difficult.227 As a result, many risk utility
terminations each year. In theory, budget plans—providing equal monthly bills
throughout the year based on estimates of usage—can eliminate this imbalance.
In practice, these plans’ reliance on estimates mimicking those the PHAs make,
are error-prone and can present tenants with large supplemental bills after the
221
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year-end reconciliation.228 They also attenuate tenants’ incentives to conserve
energy and may confuse some tenants about how effective their efforts have
been.
The fourth major federal effort to help low-income families meet energy costs
is even less well-known, although it serves by far the largest number of lowincome families. It is the Food Stamp Program’s excess shelter cost deduction.
The Food Stamp Program bases benefit levels on household size and income.229
In computing a household’s income, the program deducts certain largely nondiscretionary expenses that can affect the ability to purchase food. One of these
deductions is for shelter costs exceeding half of the household’s income after all
other deductions.230 Almost seventy percent of food stamp households’ shelter
costs exceed this threshold; seven million households receive more than $6
billion per year in additional food stamps because of this deduction.231
Like the HUD programs, the Food Stamp Program defines shelter costs to
include utilities as well as rent or mortgage payments.232 Like the HUD
programs but unlike WAP and LIHEAP, it provides the same level of assistance
to households whose utility costs are included in their rent. Unlike HUD but like
LIHEAP, the food stamp excess shelter deduction provides a very shallow
subsidy, offsetting only a small fraction of energy costs for participating
households: its value generally is equal to about thirty percent of that fraction of
a household’s shelter costs that exceed half of its income.233 Paradoxically, it
provides little or no aid to the very poorest households: their incomes entitle
them to the maximum food stamp benefit without the shelter deduction.234
Unlike any of the other major federal energy assistance programs, the food
stamp excess shelter deduction is both a budgetary entitlement and a responsive
entitlement,235 guaranteeing that funding will be sufficient to meet the claims of
all eligible people seeking benefits.236 Because it only offsets a minority fraction
of marginal housing costs, the excess shelter deduction has a relatively modest
impact on households’ incentives to conserve.237 In addition, all states calculate
228
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the utility portion of households’ shelter costs with a “standard utility allowance”
(SUA), which approximates reasonable usage patterns. SUAs are far less
individualized than PHAs’ utility allowances: some states differentiate only
between households with and without responsibility for primary heating or
cooling costs; at most, they may vary by the number of people in the household
and the region of the state.238 This imprecision has aroused less criticism than
PHAs face, in part because of the excess shelter deduction’s lower profile and in
part because its status as a very partial subsidy lowers the stakes. Of greater
concern has been states’ non-compliance with federal regulations requiring then
to update their SUAs annually to reflect changing utility rates.239 In any event,
because few food stamp households’ benefits depend on their actual usage, the
SUA further reduces the deduction’s impact on incentives to conserve or to seek
energy-efficient housing.
Four House and three Senate committees write these programs’ authorizing
legislation; three different appropriations subcommittees oversee their funding.
Each of these four programs is administered by a different federal department;
typically state and local administration is fragmented as well. No overarching
federal law prohibits households from benefiting from more than one of these
programs, although households receiving HUD subsidies will rarely have shelter
costs high enough to qualify for the food stamp excess shelter deduction.
Questions about the interrelationship of these programs have spawned
considerable controversy.240
2. Principles for Designing Low-Income Subsidies
Although accepting the importance of offsetting the regressive effects of
increased energy costs is a crucial first step, it is far from sufficient to guard
against those effects. As the abundant critics of social welfare programs never
tire of reminding us, many existing programs suffer from serious design
limitations. Even if legislation sets aside an appropriate amount for aid to low-
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income people, if it lacks an appropriate delivery mechanism that aid either will
fail to survive the political process or will be misdirected.
This subsection offers three principles to guide the design of a low-income
subsidy program.
These principles reflect a combination of political,
administrative, and aspirational considerations. Subsection a identifies the basic
requirements for any new low-income energy cost offset program to win initial
enactment and to survive in future years when the political process’s attention
inevitably turns to other concerns. Subsection b focuses on how to match
subsidy funds both with their specific purpose and with the general goals of
climate change legislation. Subsection c then addresses the administration of the
new offset program, recognizing that administrative shortcomings have been
major sources of both substantive failure and political attacks in existing social
welfare programs.
a. Political Efficiency
The challenges of winning a program’s initial enactment and of preserving it
over time are quite different. Conventional political science emphasizes the
advantages flowing to the party defending the status quo on an issue: that it is
easier to block changes than to initiate them. This lesson is only partially
applicable to spending programs, whose supporters need continued affirmative
actions from the government. At each juncture, the program’s health depends on
leveraging funds with available political support. Initiating a program requires a
great deal of funding, but it also comes at a time when attention to, and support
for, the program’s mission are at their apogee. The amounts of funding at issue
in any particular battle over preserving a program’s effectiveness are far
smaller—absent a political sea change, few programs lose more than a few
percentage points of their nominal funding in any given year—but bringing
political support to bear is far more difficult. This is particularly true of
programs whose support depends on the general public’s altruism: maintaining
the public’s consistent focus on most issues, certainly including low-income
people’s well-being, is difficult to impossible. These programs rarely have
natural support from powerful interest-groups and must compete with programs
that do. Thus, a program’s designers must consider both what they can enact
initially and what they can maintain under very different political conditions in
the future.
i. Initiating a Program
The keys to converting strong but transient public sympathy into legislation
are speed and simplicity. Speed is crucial because the public’s altruism will
remain not remain focused on a particular cause for long. Although altruistic
concerns are not wholly fungible, if delays prevents public-spirited voters from
achieving satisfaction through addressing one social ill, they are likely to move
on to another.241 Anti-poverty advocates discovered this in the 1970s when they
241
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helped to defeat first President Nixon’s welfare reform plan and then President
Carter’s: in each case, they imagined they would advance to a better deal but in
fact received no deal at all.
Simplicity, in turn, is important because an altruistic electorate is unlikely to
have the inclination or capacity to engage in detailed policy analysis. If voters do
not understand the proposal easily, they may either doubt that it addresses the
identified problem or suspect their good will is being manipulated for unclear
ends. The 1993-94 Clinton health care proposal’s greatest weakness was not any
particular design defect but rather the fact that, at more than 1,500 pages and
built to defy simple explanations, the public could not understand it. Non-wonks
had no basis on which to distinguish the Clinton plan from its competitors or to
adjudicate the merits of the many accusations about its contents. A proposal
need not be simple on its face as long as the public can be given a clear, simple,
credible version of what the legislation does. The need to present such a picture
explains the appeal of bipartisanship even when the majority party does not
immediately need the opposition’s votes: voters seeing supporters from both
parties are more likely to accept that a simple account of the proposal is an
accurate one.
Speed and simplicity are closely related. The more time a proposal lingers,
the more opportunities interest groups have to lobby for provisions increasing its
complexity (or cost) and the more opportunities critics have to raise doubts about
the simple explanation its sponsors have offered. Simpler proposals, in turn, can
be drafted, costed, and negotiated more quickly.242
ii. Maintaining a Program
A program’s designers can pursue several different strategies for ensuring its
future durability. One is to try to develop a self-interested constituency for the
program that can defend it when the public’s attention wanes. For a variety of
reasons, social welfare programs’ front-line administrative staff have not proven
formidable champions of the programs’ funding.243 Utility companies have lent
some political support to LIHEAP and the EITC because they help recipients pay
bills. Once climate change regulation begins, however, those companies’
political agendas are likely to fill with matters more central to their profitability.
Providing benefits to higher-income people, who tend to be more politically
active, is another oft-discussed approach. Certainly the strength of the most
important single redistributive program in this country—Social Security—
springs from its strong self-interested support from middle-income voters.
Medicaid, too, may have avoided being block-granted in the 1995-96 because its
long-term care component serves large numbers of middle-income families.
Nonetheless, designing programs to be universal—to provide benefits without
regard to claimants’ means—faces several obstacles. Middle-income Americans
are very selective in what benefits they want to receive from the government. If
they do not feel a strong need for a benefit, they are likely to resent the taxes that
242
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fund it more than they appreciate the benefit itself. The fate of the all-too-aptly
named “catastrophic health care” plan of 1988—public insurance against the
otherwise unreimbursed costs of a major illness that Congress quickly repealed
after Medicare beneficiaries rebelled against the required premiums—shows the
divergent political valences of taxes and benefits. Many regard cash and nearcash transfers as acceptable only if they can be understood as social insurance.
Ongoing offsets for higher prices resulting from carbon emissions regulation fit
that model badly and thus cannot be expected to win strong middle-income
support.
A common reflex both to the political weakness of low-income people and to
middle-income people’s disdain for wealth transfers is to rely on the tax system.
Tax expenditures receive far less analytical and political scrutiny than spending
programs.244 The tax system, however, tends to be a rather inefficient tool for
these purposes. First, most devices for transferring wealth to low-income people
also spend significant sums on higher-income individuals. These reduce the
subsidies that can be provided at any given funding level. Because these
amounts are spread across large numbers of people, even a badly leaking tax
preference is unlikely to benefit any particular middle-income taxpayer enough to
increase its political support appreciably. Second, the IRS’s administrative
structure limits the ability to design the preference to target benefits to need most
efficiently.245 Third, the most prominent device for offsetting costs through the
tax code—the deduction—is regressive. A $1,000 deduction translates into far
more tax savings for an affluent person in a high tax bracket than for a family of
modest means.246 Finally, reaching low-income people at all through tax policy
requires an additional, often difficult, political step: making the preference
refundable for those with no net tax liability. This largely rules out deductions,
but even redistributive credits often are not fully refundable. For example, the
child credit is only partially refundable and the dependent care tax credit is not
refundable at all. House Republicans harshly criticized efforts to accelerate
portions of the 2001 tax cuts that primarily benefited households through
refundability. President Bush’s recent economic stimulus proposal would not be
refundable and thus would not help the poorest households.247
Without little realistic prospect of enlisting politically powerful self-interested
backers, the preservation of any low-income offset program will depend on mobilizing altruistic public opinion. Because the electorate’s future responsiveness
is uncertain—some other cause may be occupying its attention at the pivotal
juncture—minimizing the number of challenges is far more important for this
244
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sort of program than for those with reliable rent-seeking constituencies. Thus,
establishing the program as a budgetary entitlement248—independent of annual
appropriations battles—is pivotal: few discretionary programs for low-income
people have avoided steady erosion.249 Similarly, if the program is not designed
to adjust automatically for inflation, its supporters are unlikely to mobilize effectively for annual battles to protect its real value.250
To mobilize sympathetic voters to help fend off periodic challenges, simplicity of concept also is almost as important to preserving a program as it is to
creating one. A gangly program with many features whose interrelationship is
difficult to fathom can be dismembered piece by piece without the public
comprehending what is happening. These silent reductions can affect either the
number of people receiving benefits or the amount of assistance beneficiaries
receive. By far the best security against the former danger is to design a program
as a responsive entitlement: a program in which participation depends solely on
the number of applicants meeting eligibility criteria, not the amount
appropriated.251 This requires any reductions in eligibility to be achieved through
relatively transparent designations of those affected. A program’s architects can
guard against benefit erosion by establishing it as a functional entitlement,252
specifying its benefits not as an arbitrary amount but as whatever is sufficient to
accomplish some specific function. Thus, for example, a carbon regulation offset
established in dollar terms might become frozen, thus causing its real value to
erode over time.253 By contrast, basing benefits on the estimated cost increase for
the average family of a specified type would allow benefit levels to adapt
automatically to changes in the regulatory regime.254 It also would force those
248
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that would cut benefits to explain why that principle should no longer apply,
triggering a debate that should be relatively transparent to the media and voters.
b. Target Efficiency
One of the most common criticisms of a public program is that it wastes
public resources by failing to deliver them where they are most needed. Another
common complaint is that legislation creates perverse incentives. Unfortunately,
these problems are very difficult to avoid simultaneously: measures taken to
address targeting concerns often create at least the appearance of undesirable
incentives, and vice versa. Subsection i considers this trade-off as it applies to
legislation offsetting the effects of higher carbon costs on low-income people.
In several important respects, however, targeting can be improved without
seriously undermining either the practical or the expressive effects of incentives.
Subsections ii through iv explore these possibilities.
i. Balancing Targeting and Incentives
Debates about the design of major mean-tested programs in this country long
have been dominated by debates between the largely inconsistent goals of
targeting and incentives. Unlike many debates in anti-poverty law, this one does
not break down on families left-right grounds: Ronald Reagan and Daniel
Patrick Moynihan advocated targeting; Newt Gingrich and David Ellwood focus
on incentives. Targeters maintain that limited public funds available for social
programs can be spent most efficiently—can do the most good—if concentrated
on those in greatest need. Some conservatives also may justify an emphasis on
targeting by disputing the appropriateness of public interventions absent any but
the direst deprivations and by arguing that receipt of direct public aid is
demeaning and should be confined to as few people as possible. Thus, President
Reagan justified his sweeping cuts of low-income programs as an effort to limit
them to the “truly needy,” who, he said, would retain a “safety net.” Pragmatic
progressives may see targeting as protection against critics’ efforts to induce
taxpayers’ jealousy by portraying recipients of benefits as better-off than some of
those whose taxes fund that aid. Those with direct experience working in lowincome communities may favor targeting both because it eliminates the most
wrenching crises and because they are skeptical that incentives built into public
benefit program rules have much practical effect.
Incentivizers, by contrast, see public benefits programs in more economic
terms, taking a dynamic view of low-income people’s relationships with those
programs. They want to give more aid to those engaged in certain socially
desirable activities. To the extent that that activity makes the claimant better-off
financially, rules that reward that activity produce results precisely opposite to
those targeting benefits on need. Work has long been the main, although not the
exclusive, focus of incentives in public benefits programs. David Ellwood
advocated making work pay better than welfare by increasing supports to the
working poor; Newt Gingrich sought to achieve the same goal by cutting welfare.
Even where evidence calls into question recipients’ actual responsiveness to
programs’ incentives, they may dislike the expressive effects of a program
treating people engaged in desirable behavior better than those that are not.
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Conservatives that see financial poverty as a consequence of behavioral poverty
favor strong incentives; some suggest that eliminating means-based programs
altogether provides the strongest possible work incentive.
Pragmatic
progressives may prefer programs with strong behavioral incentives because they
attract recipients whose actions arouse more sympathy among middle-class
voters distrustful of the poor.
The tension between targeting and incentives takes on an additional
dimension in remedying the distributional effects of climate change policy. High
energy costs are both an important determinant of need for subsidies and
sometimes the result of behavior the policy seeks to discourage. Price increases
cause the sharpest reductions in consumption among low-income families,255
which is just what climate change policy desires but which could cause severe
hardship if the families cannot manage the costs.
In addition, the income effects of subsidies on low-income people can be
difficult to predict. At the margins, it would seem that more income would allow
low-income people to spend more on energy and emit more. Sufficient energy
price increases, however, could make many forms of energy usage an inferior
good: one whose consumption declines with rising incomes. Specifically, as
low-income families gain modest amounts of discretionary income, they may
apply that to reducing their need for energy consumption by weatherizing,
purchasing a more fuel-efficient car, or paying the higher rents required to live
near work or public transit lines.
Incentives in public benefit programs inevitably are crude instruments.256
They almost inevitably fall on some individuals who lack the capacity to act in
the preferred manner, such as work incentives applied to households in which all
members are children or adults having to care for seriously infirm individuals.257
Any system of incentives implies a judgment about which conditions should
be taken as givens and which should be treated as the result of individual choice.
Badly insulated dwellings have higher heating and cooling costs, which increase
need for subsidies. Many badly insulated units have relatively affordable rents,
due to ill-repair or simply because of the higher expected utility bills. Thus, lowincome people probably live disproportionately in such units. Yet adjusting
subsidies on this basis would undermine conservation incentives.
A more difficult question is whether to adjust for the household’s location of
residence. Urban areas have dramatically lower per capita fuel consumption than
rural ones.258 Various federal subsidies help keep alive many rural communities
in states with harsh winters on the Great Plains. Significant savings thus could
be achieved if more people moved to cities. Nostalgia for rural America, and
those states’ strong representation in the Senate, ensure that concept would never
255

C-SNAP, FUTURE FUEL, supra note 27, at 2.
See Alstott, supra note 245, at 545 (“Economic theory can establish the existence of disincentives
to work or to marry, but empirical study is needed to establish whether and how those disincentives
actually affect people’s decisions to work or to marry.”).
257
Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1073 (9th Cir. 1994).
258
Light, Urban Environment, supra note 55, at 22-23.
256

63

gain traction in U.S. politics. Whether a low-income offset program would need
to adjust its benefits for higher rural costs, however, is less clear.
Still more compelling is the claim of low-wage workers, many of whom must
consume significant amounts of energy to commute. Failure to adjust the
subsidies for these costs could reduce incentives to work. On the other hand,
these costs encourage people to seek work near their residences, or at least on
public transit lines, which is consistent with the goal of energy conservation.
Adjustments for the cause of increased costs, rather than for the costs themselves,
can avoid work disincentives while maintaining incentives to take jobs with
modest or no commuting costs.
ii. Temporal Targeting
Separate targeting and incentives issues arise on very different dimensions:
horizontal and temporal.259 Horizontal targeting compares different claimants,
seeking to get more benefits to those in greatest need. Horizontal incentives,
similarly, compare claimants and reward those acting more in the desired manner
than their peers. Temporal targeting, by contrast, seeks to get aid to claimants
during their greatest periods of need rather than waiting until the worst of a crisis
has passed. Temporal incentives, by extension, activate or deactivate additional
benefits whenever a claimant begins or ends compliance with desired norms.
Temporal targeting is especially important to low-income households because
their impaired access to credit markets prevents them from moving funds cheaply
from periods of relative plenty backward to those of exceptional deprivation. No
comparable reason exists for matching incentives as closely with need: most
people work for wages delivered substantially after the fact. Because incentive
payments are not tied specifically to needs, even low-income families will be
better able to await receipt of those payments if they cannot obtaining their
present value. The expressive value of incentives is almost always perceived
horizontally, separating “good” from “bad” individuals rather than tracking
individuals over time. Thus, whatever balance is struck between targeting and
incentives in the basic structure of the low-income offset program, every reason
exists to endeavor to deliver those offsets as close to the time the a household
experiences increased costs. PHA utility allowances’ failure to adjust to seasonal
swings in households’ energy costs
This raises serious concerns about proposals to deliver relief from higher
energy prices through the tax system.260 Already, a full-time, year-round
minimum wage worker supporting a family of four derives more than twenty-two
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percent of her or his annual income from the earned income tax credit (EITC).261
Thus, the family goes through the year living at barely three-quarters of the
poverty line, only to receive a lump sum a few months after the year is over that
analysts commonly add to their prior year’s income retroactively when
comparing the household to the poverty line. About half the states have their
own EITCs, many adding between 3.5 and 35 percent to the federal credit.262
The fraction of their annual income that low-income families receive through the
tax system is likely to rise if important tax expenditures benefiting middleincome families are extended to low-income people through conversion to
refundable credits.
In practice, EITC recipient families commonly run up debts during the year,
often incurring onerous interest payments, and then try to dig themselves out
when their tax refund arrives the following spring. Regulators in some northern
states prohibit utility companies from terminating service during the winter
months; many families with large arrearages anxiously await their tax refunds,
hoping they will arrive before the year’s moratorium comes to an end. The
temporal mismatch in PHA utility allowances is far less severe than that in an
annual tax refund, yet it has resulted in many households falling seriously behind
on their utilities and facing shut-offs.
In sum, the tax system is an inefficient method of delivering energy
assistance. To the extent that we can plausibly increase the share of low-income
families’ annual income derived from the tax system, we should do so to reduce
those families’ implicit marginal tax rate. The tax system should be assigned
new non-tax-related functions only as a last resort.
iii. Reaching All Affected Low-Income People
Trying to design a system for offsetting the increased costs of energy to lowincome people highlights how badly damaged our social safety net has become.
Because of this country’s heavy reliance on the private sector for social
provision,263 and its sharply moralistic approach to public provision,264 several
large categories of low-income people have no contact with any major federal or
federal-state means-tested public benefit program.
One large excluded group is non-elderly childless adults that do not have a
disability sufficiently severe to qualify for Social Security. These people never
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qualified for federal cash assistance or Medicaid, but they could receive modest
state cash aid—commonly called “general assistance” or “general relief”—in
many states until these programs were abolished as states struggled to cope with
the recessions of the early 1980s and the early 1990s. They also qualified for
federal food stamps until the 1996 welfare law.265
Some may receive unemployment compensation (UC), although the UC
system is ill-equipped to administer a low-income offset program because it does
not collect information on individuals’ or households’ incomes. Thus, someone
with large unearned income, or in a household with a high-salaried worker, can
nonetheless collect UC. Conversely, the UC system’s coverage of relatively lowincome workers has been declining steadily for decades as the low-end labor
market has become increasingly contingent. UC therefore does not offer a viable
mechanism for reaching low-income families needing subsidies.
iv. Preventing Supplantation
Whatever funds can be secured for low-income offsets will provide a low
return on the political capital invested to secure them if other entities can
effectively divert them. The most likely method for diversion is supplantation:
the intermediary reduces its own contributions apace with the infusion of offset
funds. Funneling offset funds into a discretionary program such as LIHEAP or
Section 8 invites appropriators to reduce the contributions they otherwise would
have provided.266 Similarly, block grants such as LIHEAP and TANF allow
states sufficient flexibility to direct increased funding to replace their own
spending, releasing money back to their general funds.267
Proposals to pay utility companies to aid low-income customers face a similar
likelihood of leakage. The uncompensated care requirement of the Hill-Burton
program268 provides a useful caution in this regard. The Hill-Burton Act conditioned federal funds for hospitals’ major capital investments on recipient institutions providing uncompensated care to low-income patients in specified amounts.
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Although some hospitals took this requirement to heart and welcomed uninsured
low-income patients, others continued to rebuff patients who appeared unable to
pay. These hospitals treated Hill-Burton as a bookkeeping requirement, charging
off their unanticipated bad debts to it. Similarly, separating actions the utilities
would have taken in the ordinary course of business from subsidies motivated by
the carbon regulation offset program will be impossible. The reliance of the
House bill, and other proposals, on having utility companies distribute energy
assistance269 thus is badly misguided: few of those funds are likely to serve their
intended purpose.
c. Administrative Efficiency
Administrative simplicity is important for several reasons. Most directly,
funds spent on program administration are unavailable for benefits. In addition,
an arduous, or simply unfamiliar, administrative process can compel claimants to
spend the equivalent of a significant portion of their benefits to establish and
maintain their eligibility.270 A program’s administration is a relatively vulnerable
political target for critics who may fear a backlash if they attack the program’s
core mission. Finally, setting up a complex administrative structure delays a
program’s implementation, which is both a substantive and a political problem:
programs are easiest to cancel politically before anyone has begun receiving aid.
A low-income offset program for emissions regulation therefore should
operate through a single agency, to avoid requiring duplicative applications and
eligibility determinations.271 Ideally, it would rely as much as possible on
determinations already being made by existing programs. The major federalstate entitlement programs’ administrative spending is relatively modest. In
recent years, the Food Stamp Program’s administration has hovered around 15
percent of overall program costs.272 Medicaid’s administrative costs in 2006
were 5.4 percent of the total.273
V. Conclusion
Climate change is no ordinary policy problem. Its regulation certainly is no
ordinary policy initiative. No one should be surprised, therefore, that reaching
principled choices about its substantive scope requires more than routine policy
analysis. A purely political calculus likely will result in legislation that ignores
urgent human needs while providing environmentally counterproductive
subsidies to existing providers. On the other hand, a purely sentimental approach
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also will prove unavailing, wasting large sums on projects that, while appealing,
are likely to receive adequate funding from elsewhere. Yet even if policymakers
can resist these temptations, they nonetheless will face many more legitimately
worthy and important claims than available funds can possibly satisfy. Policy
analysis tools designed to assess proposals’ cardinal merit, or at best compare a
handful of similar approaches to a similar problem, offer little hope of sorting
through this blizzard of policy proposals. No rational response is possible
without effective, defensible principles for determining which ancillary claims
ought to be joined with climate change legislation.
Reasonable principles can be derived from a combination of experience and
widely accepted norms. Applying those principles suggests a strong case for
including both distributional and fiscal concerns in climate change debates. Once
this occurs, fiscal progress will depend, as it always does, on political will. The
challenges of designing a program to offset the impoverishing effects of carbon
emissions regulation without undermining its incentives to conserve is a
formidable challenge that policymakers have failed in the past. This problem is
not, however, insuperable.
Scientists tell us that we have little time. To date, however, we have had a
still greater shortage of political will, both to face the daunting challenges of
designing sound climate change legislation and to impose the pain required to
achieve meaningful emissions reductions. To be sure, taking the steps this article
recommends would require considerable political will. If such will remains in as
short supply as it has been to date, however, we have no chance of slowing
climate change meaningfully—or maintaining the environment we have come to
take for granted.
Climate change cannot be checked on the backs of the weakest among us.
Fortunately, it does not have to be.
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